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Oliver: Opening the Channels of Communication Among Employers: Can Employ

OPENING THE CHANNELS OF
COMMUNICATION AMONG EMPLOYERS:
CAN EMPLOYERS DISCARD THEIR "NO
COMMENT" AND NEUTRAL JOB REFERENCE
POLICIES?
I.

INTRODUCTION

While working at Stereo, Inc., Tom received twenty-four
disciplinary warnings for outrageous acts that ranged from violence in
the workplace to alcohol and drug abuse on the job before his employer
discharged him.' When searching for other employment, Tom listed the
name of his former employer, Stereo, Inc., on his application. A
prospective employer inquired about Tom's past job performance with
Stereo, Inc. However, Stereo, Inc. provided limited information, which
2
merely consisted of confirming Tom's title and dates of employment.
The prospective employer, who had no knowledge of Tom's violent past,
hired him. While working at his new job, Tom savagely beat and
murdered his co-worker, Lisa.
3
This opening illustration represents the established trend of
companies adopting "no comment" polices 4 or neutral job reference
policies5 in order to avoid defamation liability 6 or Title VII retaliatory

I This illustration was based on an actual case, Moore v. St. Joseph Nursing Home, Inc., 459

N.W.2d 100 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990). The Moore court held that the former employer did not
owe a duty to an unknown third party who was murdered by the dangerous former
employee because no special relationship existed between the former employer and the
third-party victim. Id. at 102, 103. Therefore, the Moore court determined that the former
employer was not liable for failing to disclose to a prospective employer that its former
employee had previously shown violent behavior in the workplace. Id.
2 In the actual case of Moore v. St. Joseph Nursing Home, Inc., Tom's new employer did not
contact his former employer; however, the latter admits that if it had been contacted to give
a reference, it would have given the prospective employer only limited employment
information, such as dates of employment. Id. at 102, 103.
3 See infra part II.A. This part addresses why employers adopted "no comment" and
neutral job reference policies.
4 See infra note 9. Employers have "no comment" reference policies or "non-disdosure"
policies when they provide no information for a prospective employer regarding a former
employee's character or job performance. Id.
5 See infra note 10. Under a neutral job reference scheme, employers provide limited
information such as a former employee's name, title of position, dates of employment, and
salary, for a prospective employer. Id.
6 See infra notes 53 to 126 and accompanying text. See also W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 773 (5th ed. 1984). "Defamation.. .tends to injure
'reputation,' in the popular sense; to diminish the esteem, respect, goodwill or confidence
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claims brought by former or departing employees. 7 A 1995 survey
conducted by the Society for Human Resource Management found that
sixty-three percent of personnel managers refused to provide
information about former employees for fear of landing in court.8 Under
"no comment" reference policies, employers provide no information
regarding a former employee or a departing employee, and as a result,
prospective employers are unable to obtain reliable and accurate
information about a job applicant. 9 Moreover, under a neutral job
reference scheme, employers provide only limited information such as a
former employee's name, position title, dates of employment, and salary
for prospective employers. 10
The principal reason why employers have adopted "no comment"
reference policies originates from a perceived dilemma between
choosing to disclose or to omit negative information in a reference, such
as a former employee's previous violent behavior or poor work
performance. 1 ' Specifically, when employers provide a complete
in which the plaintiff is held, or to excite adverse, derogatory or unpleasant feelings or

opinions against him." Id.
7See infra part II.C. This part presents the case of Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337,
117 S. Ct. 843 (1997). A unanimous Supreme Court, per Justice Clarence Thomas, held that
a former employee may bring a retaliation cause of action under Title VII section 704(a)

against his former employer for giving a negative reference in response for his having filed
a race discrimination suit against the employer. Id. at 844-49. The Supreme Court reasoned
that the retaliatory provision, section 704(a), applied to both current employees and former
employees. Id.
s Frances A. McMorris, Ex-Bosses Face Less Peril Giving Honest Job References, WALL ST. J.,
July 8,1996, at B1 [hereinafter McMorris].
9 Jack Kenny, Beware Giving References for Ex-Employees, N.H. BUS. REv. Feb. 14, 1997, at 1
[hereinafter Kenny] (stating that "non-disclosure" policies adopted by many companies
means that prospective employers are unable to obtain reliable and accurate job histories of
applicants). See also Bradley Saxton, Flaws in the Laws Governing Employment References:
Problems of "Overdeterrence" and a Proposalfor Reform, 13 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 45 (1995)
[hereinafter Saxton, Flaws in the Laws]. Many companies have adopted policies, referred to
as "no comment" policies in which employers refuse to provide job references for former
employees or departing employees when the employee or prospective employer request
such information. Id.
10William D. Frumkin & Louis G.Santagelo, Title Vll's Anti-Retaliation Provision Extends to
Former Employees, 217 N.Y. L.J. 52 (1997) [hereinafter Frumkin & Santagelo, Title VII]
(asserting that "neutral" references confirm dates of employment and positions held).
11John P. Furfaro & Maury B. Josephson, Workplace Violence II, N.Y. L.J., July 7, 1995, at 3
[hereinafter Furfaro & Josephson, Workplace Violence Ill. This article adequately
summarizes the employer's dilemma:
On the one hand, it is in a company's interest to know that job
references it receives will be accurate, so that it may make appropriate
hiring decisions and prevent the possibility of workplace violence in
the future. On the other hand, many employers worry that honestly
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reference that includes both positive and negative aspects about a former
employee's employment, they risk being sued by a former employee for
defamation 2 or a Title VII retaliatory claim. 13 On the other hand, when
employers give only favorable recommendations without disclosing any
negative facts such as a former employee's criminal behavior, they could
be held liable for negligent misrepresentation 4 if the former employee
subsequently harms a third person as demonstrated in the opening
illustration.' s Faced with a dichotomy of conflicting tort doctrines,
disclosing a former employee's violent record in a negative job
reference might expose the company to potential liability for
defamation or invasion of privacy. Consequently, many employers
simply give a former employee's name and dates of employment when
asked for a reference.
Id. See also Michell Quinn, Sifting Sands of Employment Law Can Trap Unwary Managers,SAN
DIEGO UNION & TRIB., July 22,1996, at C2 (available on 1996 WL 2170951) (quoting a lawyer
from a San Diego law firm, "You are liable if you open your mouth.. .you're now liable if
you don't").
12 MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.8 (1994) [hereinafter ROTHSTEIN,
EMPLOYMENT LAW] (stating that written and oral statements in the workplace have given
rise to defamation actions); see also Kathy Hagood, Employers Wary of References LawsuitFearing Companies Limit Information on Ex-Workers, FLA. TODAY, July 13, 1997, at 01E
(available on 1997 WL 11484603) (stating that employers' former employees who allege that
they have been defamed by references have taken many of those employers to court);
References Once More Become a Land Mine, BALT. Bus. J.,
Mar. 14,1997 (available on 1997 WL
7896485) [hereinafter Land Mine] (expressing that traditionally, employers have been most
concerned with defamation claims where an employer falsely informs another person and
damages the employees' reputation). Anne Lewis, References: An Employer's Dilemma
(visited Feb. 13, 1998) <http://www.fryberger.com/referenc.html> (stating that many
businesses fear possible defamation claims if they give out negative information about
former employees); Kenny, supra note 9, at 1 (expressing that attorneys have advised
employers to merely confirm dates of employment because a reference of this nature keeps
employers out of trouble with respect to defamation, and precludes prospective employers
from claiming that the employer misled them); See infra notes 53 to 126 and accompanying
text.
13
See infra notes 261 to 276 and accompanying text.
14See infra notes 230 to 248 and accompanying text.
IsJulie Forster, 25 States Adopt "Good Faith" Job Reference Laws to Shield Businessfrom Liability,
WEST'S LEGAL NEWS,July 2, 1996, at 6402 (availablein 1996 WL 363324) [hereinafter Forster,
Good Faith Reference Laws]. This article quotes Allen Willis, a lobbyist in Idaho and Oregon,
who states, "Some companies have been sued for not giving out information when they
knew that the terminated employee was involved in some criminal conduct or conduct
such that the employee could not be retained. It was one of those damned if you do,
damned if you don't...." Id. Employees have taken their former employers to court,
claiming that they were defamed in employment references. However, in other cases,
prospective employers have sued former employers for failing to disclose that employees
displayed problems such as violent behavior. Hagood, supra note 12, at 01E. See, e.g.,
Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified Sch. Dist., 929 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1997). In this case, an injured
third party sued a former employer, absent a special relationship between these two
parties, for negligent misrepresentation and intentional misrepresentation. Id.
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employers have chosen to say very little about a former employee's work
performance or displayed violent behavior. 16 Thus, employers have
created either "no comment" policies or neutral job reference schemes in
17
order to protect themselves from potential liability.
Furthermore, employers who fail to disclose criminal information
about a former employee in fear of defamation claims should be aware
that they not only put themselves at risk for negligent misrepresentation,
but they also place at risk the physical safety of third parties.18 For
example, in Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified School District19 a former
employer provided a favorable reference that omitted negative
information regarding an employee's past sexual misconduct. 20 The
California Supreme Court held that the former employer was liable for
injuries sustained by a third party who was sexually assaulted by the
employee. 21 The Randi W. court determined that liability could be
imposed against former employers if a recommendation amounted to an
affirmative misrepresentation that presented a foreseeable and
substantial risk of physical harm to a third person. 22 Therefore,
employers who give false or only partially correct favorable references in
order to avoid defamation claims could be held liable to unknown third

16See supra notes 7 to 15; see also infra notes 279 to 284 and accompanying text.
17See supra notes 7 to 15; see also infra notes 279 to 284 and accompanying text.
isRichard J. Reibstein, CalifOrnia Supreme Court Recognition of Common Law Claim Based on
Favorable Job Reference Could Put Employers Nationwide Between a Rock and a Hard Place, 19
NAT'L L.J.,
Mar. 10, 1997, at B5 (expressing that if employers fail to disclose the accusation
or refuse to provide a job reference, they may expose others to harm, and themselves to
substantial liability to unknown third parties under the Randi W. decision); J. Gregory
Comett, Reference Request Demands Caution, COURIER J., Sept. 7, 1997, at 03E (available on
1997 WL 6648149). This article provides that:
In certain situations, such as where the former employee was violent
toward co-workers or stole from [an employer], [the employer] may
have a duty to disclose that information to protect the inquiring person
from suffering injury. There are an increasing number of lawsuits
against former employers by subsequent employers or third parties
based on failure to disclose relevant information.
Id. See generally Doe v. Garcia, 961 P.2d 1181 (Idaho 1998); Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified
Sch. Dist., 929 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1997); Jemer v. Allstate Ins. Co., Fla. Cir. Ct. No. 93-09472
(1993); Gutzan v. Altar Airlines Inc., 766 F.2d 135 (3d Cir. 1985); Moore v. St. Joseph
Nursing Home, Inc., 459 N.W.2d 100 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990); Cohen v. Wales, 133 A.D.2d 94
(N.Y. App. Div. 1986).
19929 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1997).
20Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified Sch. Dist., 929 P.2d 582,585 (Cal. 1997).
21 See infra part IV. This discussion closely examines the case of Randi W. v. Muroc Joint
Unified Sch. Dist., 929 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1997).
22Randi W., 929 P.2d at 584.
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parties for not stating the "whole truth" regarding a former employee's
dangerous proclivities. 23
In addition, employees and third parties are vulnerable to a growing
epidemic of workplace violence. 24 Presently, more than 1,000 employees
are murdered in workplaces each year, which is thirty-two percent more
homicides than the annual average in the 1980's. 25 Ironically, despite an
increase in workplace violence, 26 employers choose not to talk about
their former employees. 27 As a result, prospective employers simply
cannot obtain a solid character reference for an applicant; therefore,
prospective employers unknowingly hire violent or dangerous
individuals and subject themselves to negligent hiring liability.28 Hiring
dangerous employees has serious consequences in the workplace
because these employees jeopardize the safety of all co-workers and the
public-at-large. 29 As the opening scenario demonstrates, the former
employer's neutral job reference policy could have been a factor in the
death of Tom's co-worker, Lisa. If Stereo, Inc. had been more open and
willing to disclose information regarding Tom's violence and alcohol
abuse, then Tom would not have been hired. Further, Tom would not

23 Reibstein, supra note 18, at B5 (expressing that if employers fail to disclose the accusation

or refuse to provide a job reference, it may expose others to harm, and itself to substantial
liability to third parties under the Randi W. decision); see also O'Brien v. Papa Gino's of
America, Inc., 780 F.2d 1067, 1073 (1st Cir. 1986). In O'Brien, an employer's failure to tell
the whole truth for the reasons regarding a former employee's dismissal constituted a lie.
Id. Thus, the court barred the employer from asserting a "truth" defense in a defamation
claim
brought by the former employee. Id.
24
See infra part IH.C.
25
Kenneth McCormick & James Darren Stewart, Employers Confront Violence in the Workplace
of the '90s, MED. LAB. OBSERVER, May 1,1996, at 34 [hereinafter McCormick & Stewart].
26
See infra notes 313 to 317 and accompanying text.
27 See infra notes 329 to 340 and accompanying text; see also Christine A. Mansfield, When
References
Come
Back
to
Haunt
You
(visited
Feb.
13,
1998)
<http://www.arentfox.com/newslett/employ/emp962d.htm>. Checking an applicant's
background has become increasingly necessary with the increase of workplace violence;
however, paradoxically, former employers are rarely candid when providing references for
their former employees because they fear potential defamation liability. Id.
28 See infra notes 318 to 340 and accompanying text. McMorris, supra note 8, at B1. This
Wall Street Journal article described a case where a company would not have hired a
woman that it eventually fired when the woman threatened a co-worker. Id. After
terminating the employee, the company discovered that the woman's previous employer
fired her for displaying violent behavior on the job. Id. See also Sherwood Ross, Hiding
Reason for Firing Just Passes Buck, SEATrLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Mar. 24, 1997, at B4
(available in 1997 WL 3191269) (quoting a president of a New York consulting firm who
stated, "a large percentage of companies only verify dates of employment... [former
employers]
just pass along the problem to somebody else").
2
9See supra notes 1, 27-28; see infra notes 318-40 and accompanying text.
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have had the opportunity to murder Lisa, and Stereo, Inc. would have
avoided liability for negligent misrepresentation.
Therefore, "no
comment" policies and neutral job reference policies have become a
problem in the workplace whereby prospective employers are unable to
obtain relevant information on a job applicant.3
This Note contends that employers should re-examine their "no
comment" and neutral job references polices and discard them in order
to promote safer workplaces.
Specifically, this Note asserts that
employers should not only be more willing to give accurate and
complete references, but that they also have a duty to disclose
information regarding a former employee's criminal behavior, previous
sexual misconduct, and dangerous tendencies. Employers should have a
duty to disclose this particular information upon request of prospective
employers, provided that states adopt "good faith" reference statutes 31
that protect employers from potential defamation or negligent
misrepresentation claims. By opening the channels of communication,
employers may freely discuss an employee's job performance, negative
or positive, without fear that a disgruntled former employee could bring
a defamation claim against them. 32 Furthermore, with the elimination of
"no comment" policies or neutral job reference schemes in the
workplace, prospective employers will be able to learn whether an
applicant acted violently at his or her prior place of employment. 33
Moreover, prospective employers will have the necessary information in
choosing whether to hire individuals based on truthful and complete
character references, which will in turn provide a safer work place for all
employees and the public-at-large.3 4
Section II discusses why employers originally created "no
comment" or neutral job reference policies.3 This Section also gives a
sufficient background in defamation, negligent misrepresentation,

* See supra notes 1, 27-28, see infra notes 318-40 and accompanying text; Saxton, Flaws in the
Laws, supranote 9, at 46-52.
31 Currently, most "good faith" reference statutes or qualified privilege statutes permit
employers to freely discuss an applicant's employment history in a reference so long as
statements are made in "good faith" and the former employer responds to a prospective
employer's request for such a reference. See infra notes 204, 221 and accompanying text.
3 See infra note 223; see also infra notes 305-18 and accompanying text.
3 See infra notes 310-40 and accompanying text.
34 See infra notes 310-40 and accompanying text.
3 See infra notes 45-51 and accompanying text.
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intentional misrepresentation, and Title VII retaliatory reference claims.3 6
Additionally, this Section discusses the defenses to defamation,37
including the qualified privilege defense, which protects employers from
defamation liability when supplying reference information. 38 Section I
unfolds the negative effects of "no comment" and neutral job reference
39
policies, such as workplace violence and negligent hiring liability.
Section IV introduces several cases, including Randi W. v. Muroc Joint
Unified School District,4° in which some state courts have carved out
exceptions to the required special relationship of a negligence claim,
holding that former employers may be held liable for negligent
misrepresentation to unknown third parties. 41 Finally, Section V
proposes a model statute that alleviates the problem of "no comment"
and neutral job reference policies for all states, including those states that
have already promulgated job reference immunity statutes.42 The
proposed statute provides an incentive for employers to implement a
more open communication practice regarding references by granting
employers civil immunity for not only defamation charges brought by
former employees, but also negligent misrepresentation claims brought
by unknown third parties. 43 The proposed statute also recommends that
states adopt a "duty to disclose" condition to be imposed on employers
in special circumstances where the employer reasonably believes that a
former employee has engaged in criminal behavior, previous sexual
misconduct, or possesses dangerous and violent tendencies. 44

II. A BACKGROUND ON DEFAMATION, DEFENSES TO DEFAMATION,
NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION, INTENTIONAL MISREPRESENTATION,
AND TITLE VII RETALIATION

In order to fully understand the shortcomings of "no comment"
reference policies and neutral job reference practices, a discussion

3 See infra notes 53-126 and accompanying text; see infra notes 230-76 and accompanying
text.
37
See infra notes 127-221 and accompanying text.
38 See infra notes 158-221 and accompanying text.
39See infra notes 279-340 and accompanying text.
40929 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1997).
41See infra notes 337-491 and accompanying text.
42 See infra Part V. This part sets forth a model statute that provides civil immunity for
employers who give references. The statute also imposes a duty on employers to disclose
in a reference regarding a former employee's or departing employee's criminal behavior,
previous sexual misconduct, or dangerous and violent tendencies.
43See id.
44See id.
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regarding the underlying reasons why employers created and
implemented "no comment" and neutral job reference policies is
warranted. In addition, an explanation is necessary regarding the
possible claims that certain parties, such as former employees and
unknown third parties, may bring against employers who choose to give
a recommendation to prospective employers. These, claims include
defamation, negligent misrepresentation, intentional misrepresentation,
and Title VII retaliation claims.
A.

The Reasonfor "No Comment" Reference Policies

The method with which employers try to handle reference
information may be one of the most difficult issues facing employers
today.45 "No comment" or neutral job reference policies have been
popular methods for many companies in answering reference requests. 46
As a result, companies today are finding it more difficult to obtain
complete references for an applicant than companies in the past.47
According to a 1992 survey of 200 executives from 1000 U.S. companies,
sixty-eight percent of these executives found that it was more difficult to
obtain reference information in 1992 than compared to 1989.48 In short,
this statistic indicates that employers are able to obtain little or no
information about prospective employees, because former employers
refuse to give complete character references. 49
The development and acceptance of "no comment" or neutral
reference policies resulted from employers' fears of potential defamation
5 1° With
liability.
a defamation cause of action, an employee could bring a
45 ROGER B. JACOBs, ESQ. & CORA S. KOcH, LEGAL COMPLIANCE GUIDE TO PERSONNEL

MANAGEMENT 272 (1993) [hereinafter JACOBS & KOCH].

Furfaro & Josephson, Workplace Violence II, supra note 11, at 4 (stating that many
employers give a former employee's name and dates of employment when asked for a
reference); see also Edward McDonough, Bosses Tread Legal Line on References, SALT LAKE
TRIB., Apr. 6,1997, at AA5 (expressing that although a former employee has been fired for a
serious cause, many employers as a matter of policy, will give good or at least a neutral job
reference of that employee to a prospective employer since these policies protect employers
from defamation suits); Michelle Quinn, Shifting Sands of Employment Law Can Trap Unwary
Managers, SAN DIEGO UNION & TRIB., July, 22, 1996, at C2 (stating that managers now just
verify names and dates of employment because they know better than to be completely
open when called by another company for reference).
47Saxton, Flaws in the Laws, supra note 9, at 46-49.
4
8See id.
49 See id. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
50See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text. In order to avoid defamation liability,
many employers provide only "neutral" references for former employees confirming dates
of employment and positions held. Frumkin & Santagelo, Title VII, supranote 10, at 52. In
46
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claim against a former employer if, when giving a reference, the
employer stated something negative and false about the employee.5 '
However, employers' fears concerning defamation accountability seem
to be unfounded.5 2 The next section addresses the tort of defamation and
analyzes its complex constitutional requirements in relation to the
employment setting.
B.

The Law of Defamation

When giving a reference, employers should keep in mind the
possible claims that various parties could bring against them such as
defamation, Title VII retaliation, negligent misrepresentation, and
intentional misrepresentation claims.0 For the purposes of discussion,
an understanding of the fundamental elements of defamation and its role
in an employment context is imperative. Further, an explanation of First
Amendment jurisprudence and constitutional restrictions on the
freedom of speech must also be addressed.
The First Amendment provides in part, "Congress shall make no
law.. .abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." 54 Some legal
recent years, employees have brought defamatory reference claims against their former
employers. Consequently, to reduce exposure to defamation lawsuits, employers are
giving fewer and less complete job references. Furfaro & Josephson, Workplace Violence II,
supranote 11, at 3.
51
See supranotes 11-12 and accompanying text.
52 See infra part IM.A. See also Amy Saltzman, Suppose They Sue? Why Companies Shouldn't
Fret So. Much About Bias Cases, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept. 22, 1997 [hereinafter
Saltzman, Shouldn't Fret So Much].
53 The SOHO Guidebook-Limiting Employment Reference Risks (visited Feb. 13, 1998)
<http://www.toolkit.cchcom/text/P5_8670.htm.> [hereinafter SOHO Guidebook].
Other claims that employees may bring against their former employers include the
following: invasion of privacy, interference with prospective employment claims, and
blacklisting claims. Id. Under invasion of privacy claims, employers may be taken to court
if they provide personal information about an employee such as marital or financial status,
even though the information is true because the truth is not a defense to this cause of
action, unlike defamation. Id. Therefore, an employer should only disclose private
information if she believes that it will serve a business purpose; and to avoid liability, the
employer should obtain an employee's consent to disclosure. Id. In addition, blacklisting
laws make it a crime when employers provide bad references in retaliation for a former
employee's participation in union activities. Id. However, most blacklisting laws allow
employers to send recommendations if the information is neither defamatory nor false. Id.
54The First Amendment of the Constitution provides:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble,
and to petition the Government for redress of grievances.
U.S. CONST. amend. I
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commentators and judges have adopted an "absolutist" position55 by
interpreting this text to mean that no law shall ever restrict a person's
First Amendment right to speak freely.5 6 However, over the course of
the twentieth century, the Supreme Court has placed restrictions on a
person's right to freely express her ideas; thus, some forms of speech and
expression are not protected by the First Amendment.5 7 Under the
common law, unprotected speech includes but is not limited to libelous
speech,58 obscene speech, 59 child pornography, 6° and speech that incites

acts to overthrow the government. 61 Moreover, a person's First
Amendment right to free speech is not an absolute right, but rather in
special circumstances, speech may be regulated and suppressed by the
government.62 The following discussion addresses one limitation on free
An individual undertakes an "absolutist" position by literally interpreting the First
Amendment text whereby all speech is protected under the First Amendment, including
obscene speech and defamatory speech; hence, no speech shall be regulated by the
government. Edmund Cahn, Justice Black and First Amendment "Absolutes": A Public
Interview, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 549, 554 (1962). Justice Black held an "absolutist" position of
the First Amendment:
I believe when our Founding Fathers, with their wisdom and
patriotism, wrote this Amendment, they knew what they were talking
about. They knew what history was behind them and they wanted to
ordain in this country that Congress, elected by the people, should not
tell people what religion they should have or what they should believe
or say or publish, and that is about it. [The First Amendment] says "no
law," and that is what I believe it means.
Id.
55

- JOHN E. NowAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTrTUmONAL LAw 994 (5th ed. 1995)

[hereinafter NowAK & ROTUNDA]. Although Justice Black and Justice Douglas observed
an "absolutist" view towards free speech, the United States Supreme Court has never
adopted an "absolute position." Id.
57 See generally Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Gitglow v. New York (1925);
Near v. Minnesota 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Beuaharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952); Roth
v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973); New York v.
Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
5 Beuaharnais,343 U.S. at 266 (deciding that libelous utterances are not within the area of
constitutionally protected speech).
9 Roth, 354 U.S. at 484 (determining that obscenity is not protected under the First
Amendment because it is "without redeeming social importance"); and Miller, 413 U.S. at
23 (holding that obscene material is not protected by the First Amendment).
6
0oFerber,458 U.S. at 774 (holding that child pornography is not entitled to First Amendment
protection).
61Near, 283 U.S. at 716. A few cases permit prior restraint on speech. Id. The government
may regulate and suppress speech for the prevention of the obstruction to its recruiting
services when the nation is at war. Id. The government may also suppress obscene
publications, and it may regulate statements that create incitement to acts of violence and
the overthrow of government. Id.
62
WILUAM B. LOCKHART ET AL, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 614 (8th ed. 1996). Justice Holmes
observed that citizens are not free to yell "fire" falsely in a crowded theater. Id. Moreover,
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speech, namely the law of defamation, and the constitutional standards
that a plaintiff must meet in order to recover damages under this theory.
Defamation occurs when statements injure an individual's
reputation and diminish the esteem, respect, goodwill or confidence in
which the individual is held.63 Defamation tends to "excite adverse,
64
derogatory or unpleasant feelings or opinions against" an individual.
6
5
Generally, the elements of defamation include a false, unprivileged
statement that was defamatory to the plaintiff, published to a third party,
and caused actual injury to the plaintiff. 66 The following section
provides a more detailed discussion of these elements in an employment
setting.
1. The Elements of Defamation
For defamation to occur in the employment context there must be a
false statement about an employee. 67 Originally, under the common law,
an employer would be held strictly liable for false and defamatory
statements made about employees. 68 In other words, no matter how
the Court has not treated the First Amendment guarantees as an absolute right. In certain
special circumstances, an individual's right to freely express her beliefs must be balanced

against other interests of society. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 56, at 1007-08.
Additionally, in Near v. Minnesota, the Supreme Court proclaimed that liberty of speech is
not an absolute right, and the state may punish its abuse. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S.
697,708 (1931).
63KEETON ET AL., supra note 6, at 773.
6 See id.
65 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 1.08 (1997) [hereinafter SMOLLA].

Smolla

recognized that a succinct definition of a modem cause of action for defamation would be
difficult to surmise since the constitutional requirements differ depending on the public or
private status of the individual. Id. Further, states disagree on the method of which they
apply the requirement of special harm. Id. Consequently, this Note only refers to the
above elements of defamation. Other elements may be included or excluded depending on
the jurisdiction.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977).

The elements of a

defamation claim consist of the following- (a) a false and defamatory statement concerning
another; (b) an unprivileged publication to a third party; (c) fault amounting at least to
negligence on the party of the publisher; and (d) either actionability of the statement
irrespective of special harm or the existence of special harm caused by the publication. Id.
66 ROTHSrEIN, EMPLOYMENT LAW, supranote 12, at § 2.8.
67 Philadelphia Newspaper, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767

(1986) (concluding that both a
private plaintiff and a public plaintiff must prove falsity of a defamatory statement in order
to recover damages); see also Ramona L. Paetzold & Steven L. Willbom, Employer
(Ir)Rationalityand the Demise of Employment References, 30 AM. Bus. L.J. 123, 129 (1992)
[hereinafter Paetzold & Wilbom].
68Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346-50 (1974). Under the common law for libel
actions, the Court presumed that the plaintiff had been injured from the fact of publication
without a showing of harm to the plaintiff. Id. The Court in Gertz discussed why the

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1999

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 33, No. 2 [1999], Art. 7

698 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33
reasonably the employer checked for the accuracy of her statements
made to prospective employers, courts would hold the employer strictly
liable for communicating such false statements. 69 Thus, the employer
had the burden of proving the truth of the statement.70 However, in
1974, the Supreme Court held in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.71 that the First
2
Amendment would not permit strict liability for defamatory speech.7
Therefore, in an employment situation, employers would only be held
liable for defamation if the employees could prove that the employers
were negligent or at fault in discovering the truthfulness of a statement.73
The second element of defamation is that the employer's statement
must be defamatory to the employee or former employee. 74 Under this
factor, the statement must consist of some element of personal disgrace;
however, the mere fact that the person finds it offensive is not enough to
constitute a defamatory statement. 75 A few examples of defamatory
remarks include, "he is a coward, a drunkard, a hypocrite, a liar, a crook
or.. .unfair to labor," or "he has done a thing that is.. .heartless." 76 These
assertions affect the esteem that a person holds with his community;
thus, courts have found them to be facially defamatory if untrue.77 In
contrast, courts have not found other statements to be defamatory such
as "he has left his employment during a strike" or "he has refused to
make concessions to a union." 78 Although the question of whether a
particular remark is defamatory is one for the courts to decide, courts

common law of strict liability should no longer apply to the law of defamation. Id. See
RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS: CONDIONAL PRIVILEGES § 259 (1977). The common law

imposed strict liability for publishing of a false and defamatory statement about another.

Id.
69RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: CONDMONAL PRIVILEGES § 259 (1977). The publisher

or employer was liable even though he used due care to check the accuracy of his statement
and thus reasonably believed the information to be true. Id.
70See supra notes 68-69.
n 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
72Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347-48 (1974).
73Paetzold & Willbom, supra note 67, at 129. But see KEETON Er AL, supra note 6, at 1099
n.11 (recognizing that lower courts are split on whether to apply the Gertz standard of
proving fault on the part of the defendant as applied to a non-media defendant such as an
employer).
74See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977), which states that an element of a

defamation claim includes a false and defamatory statement about another.
ET AL, supra note

6, at 775.
& Keeton present a list of facially defamatory remarks including the following:
"the plaintiff has attempted suicide.. .he refuses to pay his bill ... he is immoral.. .or queer,
75KEETON

76 Prosser

or has made improper advances toward women." KEETON ET AL., supra note 6, at 775.
7
KEETON Er AL., supra note 6, at 775.
78 See id. at 774.
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The third element of defamation is that the employer's statement
must have been published to a third party.80 The law of defamation
requires that the defamatory statement be communicated to someone
other than the alleged defamed individual, because the interest that the
law protects is the individual's reputation.8 1 However, the doctrine of
"compelled self-publication" carved out an exception to this general rule
that defamatory statements must be published to third parties.82
Employers should recognize "compelled self-defamation," also known
as "compelled self-publication," because this doctrine not only provides
a new basis for maintaining a defamation cause of action against
employers, but it also closely relates to defamation regarding
references. 83
In a compelled self-defamation situation, an employer terminates an
employee and directly conveys defamatory statements regarding the
discharge to the employee who then feels compelled to reiterate these
remarks to prospective employers.8 4 Because the employer could foresee
that the employee would feel compelled to reveal the defamatory
statements to other employers, courts have held the employer liable for
defaming the prior employee. 85 Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of
the United States"4 is a prime example of the compelled self-defamation
principle.
In Equitable Life, a former employer discharged four
employees for "gross insubordination" after the employees refused to
change their travel expense reports. 87
When searching for other

7See id.
80

REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977).

81KEEION ET AL., supranote 6, at 779.

82SMOLLA, supra note 65, at § 15.02 [3].
3Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 389 N.W.2d 876, 888 (Minn. 1986) (finding that
"compelled self-publication" provides plaintiffs with a new cause of action for defamation).
94William C. Martucci & Denise Drake Clemow, Workplace Violence: Incidents and Liability on
the Rise, EMPLOYMENT REL TODAY, Dec. 22, 1994, at 463 [hereinafter Martucci & Clemow].
A former employer may be held liable for compelled self-defamation when the employer
terminates an employee listing defamatory statements, and that employee feels compelled
to tell a prospective employer about these statements. Id.
gId.

-6389 N.W.2d 876 (Minn. 1986).
8Equitable Life, 389 N.W.2d at 881. The Equitable Life Assurance Society admitted that the
employee's production and performance were satisfactory and even commendable, and
that the company should have given the employees more thorough instructions regarding
the expense reports. Id. at 882. The company sought a refund from the employees for the
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employment, each admitted the reason for termination in an interview
with a prospective employer.88 The Equitable Life court held that the
former employer was liable for the "self-publication" defamation that
occurred when the employees were compelled to reveal the grounds for
their dismissal to prospective employers.8 9 The court found that the
employee's conduct of failing to change their expense reports did not
constitute "gross insubordination"; therefore, the company's reasons for
discharge were false. 90 The court also determined that under the
doctrine of compelled self-defamation, the former employer was liable
even though the former employer did not directly communicate or
publish the statements to a prospective employer. 91 The court found the
former employer liable under this theory, because the employer could
foresee that the employees would feel compelled to repeat these false
92
statements regarding their dismissal to prospective employers.
In addition to the publication element, defamation requires that the
statement caused actual injury to the employee. 93 Harm or actual injury
is presumed with written defamatory statements, because written
statements are likely to be permanent. 94 In contrast, for slander or verbal
defamatory statements, an employee must prove that she experienced a
special harm or actual pecuniary loss by the employer's statements
unless these remarks fall under the "slander per se" exception. 95 For

amount of $200, but the employees refused to pay this amount, and as result, the company
terminated the employees citing "gross insubordination." Id. at 881-82.
8Id. at 882.
9Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 389 N.W.2d 876,882 (Minn. 1986).
90 Id. at 889.
91Id.
92Id. at 888 (stating that in a defamation action, the publication requirement may be
satisfied where the plaintiff was compelled to publish a defamatory statement to a third
person if the defendant could foresee that the plaintiff would be so compelled).
93 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 558 (1977). An element of a defamation claim
consists of either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm or the existence
of special harm caused by the publication. Id.
94ROTHSTEIN, EMPLOYMENT LAW, supra note 12, at § 2.8.

"The "slander per se" exception states that the plaintiff need not prove harm if the
statements were made as an attack on the plaintiff's competency in his business, trade or
profession. ROTSTEIN, EMPLOYMENT LAW, supra note 12, at § 2.8. See also RESTATEMENT

(SEcOND) OF TORTS § 615 (1977) which provides:
(1) The court determines whether a crime, a disease or a type of sexual
misconduct imputed by spoken language is of such a character as to
make the slander actionable per se.
(2) Subject to the control of the court whenever the issue arises, the jury
determines whether spoken language imputes to another conduct,
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example, an employee must, prove special harm under slander if the
employee cannot find another job because of the statements made by her
former employer. 6 However, an employee will not have to prove
special harm for slander if the former employer's statements about the
employee fall under the "slander per se" exception. 97 The "slander per
se" exception states that the employee need not prove harm if the
statements were made as an attack on the employee's competency in his
business, trade, or profession.98 For instance, with an employment
reference, the departing employee or former employee may not have to
prove that the employer's statements harmed her reputation, because
employment references may fall under "slander per se" exception.99
Additionally, the elements of defamation are subject to
constitutional requirements in determining which standard of proof
should apply for either a public or private plaintiff.100 In New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan,10 1 the United States Supreme Court found that a public
official must prove that a statement made against her was made with
"actual malice," defined as "knowledge that it was false, or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not." 1°2 However, in Gertz v. Robert

characteristics or a condition incompatible with the proper conduct of
his business, trade, profession or office.
Id.
'% SMOLLA, supra note 65, at
(1977).

§ 15.04. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF TORTS § 575 cnt. b

supra note 65, at § 15.04.
98See supranote 95.
"Paetzold & Willborn, supra note 67, at 130.
100
See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323 (1974); and Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Green Moss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
According to Smoila, employment lawsuits tend to fall in a profile where the plaintiff is a
private figure, defamation is published in a non-media setting, and the subject matter
involves a private concern. The standard that the plaintiff must meet to be awarded actual
damages depends upon the plaintiff's status as a private figure or a public figure. SMOLLA,
supranote 65, at § 15.07[1]. For instance, under New York Times v. Sullivan, if the plaintiff is
a public figure, then she will have to prove that the defendant published a statement with
"actual malice" or with "reckless disregard for the truth" in order to recover actual
damages. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279, 280 (1964). However, the case
of Gertz v. Robert Welch introduced the principle that if the plaintiff is a private figure, she
will only have to prove that the defendant had been negligent in publishing a defamatory
statement in order to recover for actual damages. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, 418 U.S. 323,
97SMOLLA,

346-47 (1974).
M0l
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
102
New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80. The New York Times Court held that a public official

must show that a media defendant made statements with "actual malice" in order to
recover actual damages. Id. The Supreme Court defined "actual malice" as follows:
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Welch, Inc.,103 the Court held that a private plaintiff need not meet the New
York Times definition of "actual malice" in order to recoup compensatory
damages. 1°4 Specifically, when establishing a prima facie case for
defamation, a private plaintiff would have to prove only some degree of
fault such as negligence on the part of the defendant in publishing the
defamatory statement. 105 Thus, a private plaintiff would not be required
to show a knowing or reckless falsehood on the part of the employer's
actions. Under this decision, however, the Gertz Court held that a
private plaintiff must demonstrate the New York Times standard of
"actual malice" in order to recover punitive damages. 106 These two
cases, New York Times and Gertz, determined the breadth of
constitutional protection based on the status of an individual, private or
public, but the Court had not yet considered analyzing the law of
defamation according to the nature of the speech. 1°7
Furthermore, Frank B. Hall & Co., Inc. v. W. Buck 08 illustrated a
private plaintiff who brought a defamation cause of action against his
Actual malice is not ill will; it is the making of a statement with the

knowledge that it is false, or with reckless disregard of whether it is
true. 'Reckless disregard' is defined as a high degree of awareness of
probable falsity, for proof of which the plaintiff must present sufficient
evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact
ertertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication. An error
in judgment is not enough.
Id.
103

418 U.S. 323 (1974).

104Id. at 346-47.

Id. The Gertz court explained, "[so] long as they do not impose liability without fault,
the States may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a
publisher...of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual. Id. The Court also
expressed, "Mhe New York Times standard [applied] to private defamation actions
inadequately serves.. .competing values at stake." Id.
10 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350. The Gertz Court determined, "[T]he private defamation plaintiff
who establishes liability under a less demanding standard than that stated by New York
Times may recover only such damages as are sufficient to compensate him for actual
injury... [t]here is no justification for allowing punitive damage awards against
publishers.. .under a state-defined standard of fault." Id.
107 KEETON ET AL, supra note 6, at 108-09. But see Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Green Moss
Builders, Inc. 472 U.S. 749 (1985). In Dun & Bradstreet, the Supreme Court added a new
category to the analysis of defamation law under First Amendment jurisprudence. Id. at
761. Specifically, the Supreme Court distinguished defamatory speech with private content
from defamatory speech with public content. 1d. See infra notes 117-23 and accompanying
text.
1o 678 S.W.2d 612 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984). In Frank B. Hall & Co., Inc., Larry W. Buck was an
established salesman working for Frank B. Hall, Inc., an insurance company. Id. at 616.
The president of Hall informed Mr. Buck that his salary would be cut from $80,000 to
$65,000 and his profit sharing benefits would be eliminated because Mr. Buck failed to
1(s
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former employer. 109 The plaintiff received punitive damages after
showing that the employer's statements met the New York Times "actual
malice" standard as well as proving the "fault" for a prima facie case as
required under the Gertz ruling.110 In Frank B. Hall, a jury found a former
employer liable for $1.9 million, because the former employer informed a
prospective employer"' that his former employee was a "zero" and "a
Jekyll and Hyde person" who was "lacking in communication or
scruples."112 The court ruled that the previous employee, a private-actor
employee, met his burden of proof under the New York Times "actual
malice" standard for punitive damages by showing that the former
employer was reckless in submitting false, defamatory statements to a
prospective employer. 113 Therefore, the court affirmed the substantial
jury award.1 4 The court also found that the former employer's
statements were not mere expressions of opinion but were false and
derogatory statements of fact.11 5 The court also reasoned that proof of an
employer's ill will towards an employee coupled with other evidence
constituted a sufficient basis for establishing "actual malice" for punitive
16
damages.

produce sufficient income for Hall. Id. Shortly thereafter, the president fired Mr. Buck, and
Mr. Buck searched for other employment in the insurance industry but he failed. Id. at 617.
Then, Mr. Buck hired an investigator to find the true reasons for his dismissal. Id. The
investigator contacted Hall personnel who told him that Mr. Buck was "horrible in a
business sense, irrational, ruthless, and disliked by office personnel," and further described
Mr. Buck as a "classic sociopath." Id. The evidence proved that at the time of termination,
Mr. Buck had generated $300,000 in outstanding commissions and Hall dismissed Mr.
Buck, avoiding payment of these commissions. Id. at 616-18.
109Frank B. Hall & Co., Inc., 678 S.W.2d at 620.
110Id.
M Id. at 617. In Frank B. Hall & Co., Inc., an investigator hired by the former employee
posed as the "prospective employer." Id.
12 Id.
113Id .

114
Frank B. Hall & Co., Inc. v. W. Buck, 678 S.W.2d 612, 619-20 (rex. Ct. App. 1984). The
Frank B. Hall & Co., Inc. court recognized that the Supreme Court had not ruled on whether
the New York Times definition of "actual malice" was proper in a case involving a private
individual and a non-media defendant, such as an employer, but neither party objected to
this standard. Id. Therefore, for the issue of punitive damages, the court applied the more
strict New York Times definition of malice, which is whether the former employer's
statements were made with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless regard of the truth
of the statements. Id.
1's Id.
at 617.
1 6 Id. at 620 (providing proof that the defendant entertained ill will toward the plaintiff is
probative evidence that the defendant published the information knowing its falsity or
with reckless disregard for its truth. "Other evidence" revealed that the employer's
relationship with the former employee was "strained at best").
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One year after the Texas appellate court decided Frank B. Hall, the
Supreme Court in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Green Moss Builders, Inc. n 7
added a new category for constitutional analysis under the law of
defamation by observing the nature of the speech.118 For the first time,
the Court distinguished speech that contained private content from
speech that embodied public content.11 9 First Amendment jurisprudence
no longer required private plaintiffs to demonstrate that the defendant
committed "actual malice" under the Gertz decision in order to recover a
punitive damage award so long as the defamatory speech was a private
concern. 120 Moreover, to recover a punitive damage award, private
plaintiffs merely need to show that the defendant was negligent or at
"fault" in publishing a defamatory statement of private concern.'2 ' This is
a much less stringent standard of proving punitive damages than a
showing of "actual malice" under New York Times and Gertz.122
However, Dun & Bradstreet did not change the Gertz "fault" requirement
for establishing a prima facie case for defamation. 23
To summarize the present legal requirements for establishing a
prima facie case for defamation, private plaintiffs, like most employees,
may recover both compensatory and punitive damages with a mere
showing that the employer was negligent or at "fault" when publishing a
defamatory statement. 124 Therefore, a private plaintiff in today's society
may recover punitive damages more readily than the private plaintiffs in
Frank B. Hall, because, in that case, the court forced the plaintiffs to meet
rigorous New York Times standard of "actual malice." 125 However,

117472 U.S. 749 (1985).
118Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Green Moss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749,761 (1985).
119KEETON ET AL., supranote 6, at 109.
12DDun & Bradstreet,472

U.S. at 761.

121Id.
122

d. at 760.
123 SMOLLA, supra note 65, at § 8.07[3][a] (contending that in private figure cases which are
subject to the Gertz fault requirement, negligence is automatically part of the plaintiff's
prima facie case); KEErON ET AL, supra note 6, at 109 (stating that Dun & Bradstreetdid not
address the Gertz requirement of fault).
124 Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Green Moss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761 (1985). The
Supreme Court in Dun & Bradstreetexpressed, "In light of the reduced constitutional value
of speech involving no matters of public concern, we hold that the state interest adequately
supports awards of presumed and punitive damages-even absent a showing of "actual
malice." Id.
125 Compare Frank B. Hall & Co., Inc. v. W. Buck, 678 S.W.2d 612, 620 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984)
with Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. 749, 761 (1985). The Texas court in Frank B. Hall set forth a
higher standard of proof for punitive damages for private plaintiffs which was the New
York Times "actual malice." Whereas in the later case of Dun & Bradstreet, the Supreme
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although employees may recover punitive damages from their
employers or former employers for defamation claims with a lower
standard of proof than such claims brought prior to Dun & Bradstreet,
employers have numerous defenses against employees' claim of
defamation. 126 In fact, employers should recognize these invaluable
defenses when considering to discard "no comment" and neutral job
reference policies.
2. Employer Defenses Against Defamation Liability
The Frank B. Hall decision coupled with the Dun & Bradstreet lower
standard for proving punitive damages in defamation cases urge
employers to exercise caution when making comments about their
current employees or former employees. However, employers should
also be informed that they have the right to assert successful affirmative
defenses to claims of defamation such as the simple truth; a statement of
a mere opinion rather than statement of fact; the consent of the
employee; and the common law or statutory qualified privilege defense.
a) The Truth as an Employer's Defense to Defamation
The truth is an absolute defense against a defamation cause of
action. 127 Generally, defendants need only show that their statements
were substantially true; thus, proof of the literal truth of an accusation in
every detail would not be necessary. 28 However, this general rule may
not always be appropriate in an employment setting. 129 In O'Brien v.
Papa Gino's America, Inc.,130 a case from the First Circuit, an employer
stated that a former employee had been discharged from his job for drug
use, and though the court found this statement to be substantially
correct, it denied the employer the truth defense. 31 Specifically, the
employer's actual statement that he discharged the employee for abusing
cocaine on the job was substantially true, but the statement failed to

Court provided a lower standard of proof for punitive damages for private plaintiffs which
was proving mere fault or negligence.
126 See infra notes 127-221 and accompanying text.
127 RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 581(A) (1997) states, "One who publishes a
defamatory statement of fact is not subject to liability for defamation if the statement is
true." See also RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF ToRTs § 581(A) (1997) ant. d, "Truth of a
defamatory statement of fact is a complete bar to recovery for an action for harm caused to
another's reputation."
128
KEE'oN ET AL, supra note 6, at 842.
29
1
See, e.g., O'Brien v. Papa Gino's of America, Inc., 780 F.2d 1067 (1st Cir. 1986).
M
780 F.2d 1067 (1st Cir. 1986).
3
1 1 Id. at 1073.
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explain that the dismissal was also a result of retaliation against the
employee. 132 The court reasoned that failing to tell the whole truth was
tantamount to a lie; therefore, the employer's incomplete explanation for
the discharge amounted to a false statement, prohibiting the employer
from asserting the truth defense. 133 This case demonstrates another
reason why employers should be more willing to set forth more
complete and accurate information to prospective employers. When
employers provide some facts but omit others, they could create a
defamatory implication, and the law may hold them liable for this
implication. 134
Additionally, the employer should never state a suspicion until she
can support it with objective and detailed evidence. 13
In general,
commentators have advised former employers to provide objective facts
or opinions that can be supported by objective evidence, rather than
mere allegations, exaggerations, 136 gossip, or speculation. 137 For instance,
an employer may assert that the company discharged an employee for
missing too many days of work.13 However, employers should not
provide untenable opinions for the reasons for absenteeism, because the
employer will increase her risk of potential defamation liability. 139
Employer accusations regarding an employee who had been
involved in illegal conduct or acted improperly have become a common
source of defamation suits. 14° If the employer terminates an employee
for such circumstances and provides a reference to this effect, the
employer should restrict statements to that suspicion. 141 For example,

m Id. In O'Brien, the jury found that the employee's "termination was largely due to drug
use, but he also had retaliatory motives arising from a personal grudge." Id. The
subordinate employee who the employee refused to promote was the godson to the
president of the company and the son of the employee's supervisor. Id. at 1067.
133/d.

134KEE'ON Er AL., supra note 6, at 117 (Supp. 1988).

ImSOHO Guidebook, supra note 53.
136See, e.g., Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 389 N.W.2d 876 (Minn. 1986). The
EquitableLife court held a former employer liable for defamation when discharging former
employees and listing "gross insubordination" as the reason for termination; however the
employer actually terminated the employees because they merely refused to change travel
expense reports and refused to reimburse the company for $200. Id. at 882, 888.
137SOHO Guidebook, supra note 53.
8
1 See id.
139 See id.

140See id.
141See id.

For example, an employer should state, "[tihe Company fired the employee
because his supervisor suspected that the former employee took company property." Id.
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when an employer fires an employee for entering work while
intoxicated, defamation does not occur if the employer honestly believed
that the employee was intoxicated, and then tells the prospective
employer the truth about such an incident. 142
b) Opinion as an Employer's Defense to Defamation
Employers should also recognize that if they communicate a mere
opinion about an employee or former employee, a jury would likely find
employers not liable for defamation. 143 In the Gertz decision, the
Supreme Court expressed that under the First Amendment, "there is no
such thing as a false idea." 144 Hence, lower courts have construed this
infamous statement as being tantamount to an individual having
14
absolute immunity against liability for giving opinions. 5
For example, in a federal district court case, L Karp v. Hill and
Knowlton, Inc. 146 an employer raised this opinion defense when it made
statements against its former employee in a press release regarding a
pending lawsuit between the two parties. 147 The employer discussed the

However, the employer should refrain from stating, "an employee was fired because he
stole
company property." Id.
2
14 Steven C. Bahls &Jane Easter Bahis, Point of Reference, ENTREPRENEUR MAG., June 1,1997,
available in 1997 WL 12231332 [hereinafter Bahls & Bahls]; Paul W. Barada, Check Please:
Thorough Reference Checking Should Be Central to the Hiring Process,FIN. PLAN., Sept. 1, 1998,
available in 1998 WL 11190514 (stating. "telling the truth or giving honestly held opinion
about a former employee is a perfectly lawful thing to do"); and Land Mine, supra note 12
(explaining that an employer will not be held liable for defamation when the employer tells
a prospective employer that an employee was discharged for theft if the employer had an
honest belief that the employee committed theft and the employer fired the employee for
theft).
14 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 (1977). This section provides: "A defamatory
communication may consist of a statement in the form of an opinion, but a statement of this
nature is actionable only if it implies the allegation of undisclosed facts as the basis for the
opinion." Id.; See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 cmt. c (1977). Although the Geflz
decision was based on facts related to public matters, a private person-defendant
communicating private information would be subject to the same constitutional protection
provided for in Gertz whereby the defendant's opinions would prohibit a claim of
defamation. Id. See infra notes 145 and 149 and accompanying text.
14 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974).
145See, e.g., Mr. Chow of New York v. Ste. Jour Azure S.A., 759 F.2d 219, 224 (2d Cir. 1985)
(stating that the First Amendment prohibits statements of opinions from giving rise to
defamation claims); I.Karp v. Hill and Knowlton, Inc., 631 F. Supp. 360,364 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)
(expressing. "The First Amendment precludes expressions of opinion from giving rise to
defamation claims").
146631 F. Supp. 360 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
7
14 Id. at 365.
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pending lawsuit and expressed that the court's ruling supported its
claim that the former employee defrauded the company148 The court
held that the comment was a non-actionable statement of opinion and
not a statement of fact, thus the court exempted the former employer
from defamation liability. 149
c) Consent as an Employer's Defense to Defamation
Consent is another absolute defense1 5° in defamation cases, although
151
this defense has rarely been raised in employment defamation cases.
Under the privilege of consent, the employee is precluded from bringing
a defamation claim against the employer if the employee previously
consented to such publication.15 2 However, the employee takes a risk
3
that the employer's statements will be defamatory.1'
To ensure that the employee actually gave consent, the employer
should obtain written consent by the employee before issuing any
reference requested by a prospective employer to avoid defamation
liability.' 5 4 Particularly, the employer should obtain prior written
consent from the employee when the prospective employer seeks more
than the name, title, duties, and dates of employment, and inquires
about the employee's job skills or performance. 55 As a general rule, if
the information provided to the prospective employer is factual, and the
employee has consented to the release of information, it will be
absolutely privileged.15 6 In short, one author expressed that an
employer's best protection against defamation and other claims, which
may arise from employment references, is to acquire an employee's or
former employee's consent prior to releasing such information.157

148

Id. at 361. In the press release, the company's public relations agent stated, "Yesterday's

decision in no way questions the merits of our case against Mr. Karp, [the former
employee]. The ruling supports our claims that Mr. Karp defrauded Buckingham and that
substantial relief should be granted...." Id.
149Id.
150
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 583 (1977).
151
Paetzold & Wiiborn, supra note 67,at 132.
152

See id.

15

3 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §

154JACOBS

1s5
See id. at 274.
156See id.
157SOHO

583 cmt. d (1977).

& KOCH, supra note 45, at 272-73.

Guidebook, supra note 53.
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d) Common Law and Statutory Law Qualified Privilege
Defense to Defamation
After an employee has established a prima facie case for defamation
by demonstrating the Gertz "fault" requirement, which entails
demonstrating the former employer's negligence in publishing a
defamatory statement, the employer now has the opportunity to raise
either a common law or statutory qualified privilege defense.'5 8
Common law qualified privilege, also known as conditional privilege,
gives an employer civil immunity against defamation liability that may
occur when the employer makes defamatory statements about a
departing employee or former employee. 15 9 Under qualified privilege
protection, employers may convey statements to the departing employee
or former employee, 16° the employee's co-workers, 161 or on the
employee's performance evaluation. 162 Moreover, the qualified privilege

ISSSee Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346-47. In private figure cases, plaintiffs
must show a fault requirement as part of their prima facie case. Id. Further, traditional
common law of defamation privileges has become extremely important in defamation
actions brought by employees against their employers. SMOLLA, supra note 65 at §

15.07[2][a]. Note that employers may also be protected under a statutory qualified
privilege which provides employers with civil immunity for statements made about
employees or former employees as long as the statements are conveyed in "good faith."
Most jurisdictions which provide statutory protection allow employer immunity against
defamation daims brought by employees or former employees only when a prospective
employer requests such information, thus the former employer cannot volunteer the
information. See infra notes 206 to 211 and accompanying text.
159See, e.g., Erickson v. Marsh & McLennan Co., 569 A.D.2d 793 (N.J. 1990). The New Jersey
Supreme Court adopted a common law qualified privilege to protect employers in cases
where an employer makes a defamatory statement about a former employee to a
prospective employer concerning the former employee's qualifications. Id.; SMOLLA, supra
note
65, at §§ 15.0712][a]-[2][b]; see infra notes 160-71 and accompanying text.
160
See, e.g., Duffy v. Leading Edge Products, Inc., 44 F.3d 308, 312 (5th Cir. 1995) and Lewis
v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 389 N.W.2d 876, 890 (Minn. 1986).
Both courts in Duffy and in Equitable Life recognized that employers may raise the qualified
privilege defense in situations of self-compelled defamation in which the employer informs
the employee of the reasons for discharge, otherwise employers would decline to inform
employees of the reasons for their discharge.
161 See, e.g., Olson v. 3M Co., 523 N.W.2d 578,582-83 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994). The Olson court
found that an employer had a common interest with its employees to maintain a
harassment-free working environment and such common interest included reasonable
communications by the employer to its employees concerning action taken against
employees for sexual harassment. Id. Thus, the court concluded that the qualified
privilege protected the employer from defamation liability for disclosing information to its
employees that the former employee-plaintiff had sexually harassed two female coworkers. Id.
162 A conditional privilege extends to reports evaluating employees, including the reports
from present or past employers to a prospective employer or between the evaluating
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even protects an employer who publishes false and defamatory
statements about the employee unless the employer abuses the privilege
and the statements are not conditionally privileged. 163 The fundamental
purpose of a qualified privilege is to ensure that information openly
flows from one employer to the next concerning facts about former
employees and job applicants. 1 4 If courts did not afford employers this
protection, then negative information regarding former employees or
departing employees would never be communicated because of the
employers' fear of potential defamation liability.16
Specifically, the common law qualified privilege protects an
employer's own interests, the interests of others, or a common interest
between the speaker and recipient, such as the common interest of all
employers to receive accurate and complete information about job
applicants. 1 " For instance, a former employer's warning that informs a
prospective employer about a former employee's misconduct or bad
character will be protected under qualified privilege. 167 Moreover,
courts recognize that employers are morally justified for alerting other
employers about a former employee who demonstrated dangerous
propensities because under "ordinary societal standards a reasonable
[person] would feel called upon to speak." 1"
Furthermore, when exercising the common law qualified privilege,
employers must show that their statements were protected by meeting
the standards set forth in Restatement (Second) of Torts section 595,

employee to a fellow a reporting supervisor. SMOLLA, supra note 65, at §§ 8.08[2][d] and
15.03[1]. See, e.g., Kass v. Great Coastal Express, Inc., 676 A.D.2d 1099 (N.J. 1990). In this
case, a former employee brought a libel action against his former employer for submitting
alleged negative and false evaluations to a prospective employer. Id.
163RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 593 (1977) provides:
One who publishes defamatory matter concerning another is not liable
for the publication if
(a) the matter is published upon an occasion that makes it
conditionally privileged and
(b) the privilege is not abused.
Id.
164See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Topic 3 Conditional Privileges; Occasions

Making
a PublicationConditionallyPrivileged(1977).
16
5

See id.

id. "Occasions making a publication conditionally privileged afford a protection
based upon the public policy that recognizes that it is essential that true information be
166 See

given whenever it is reasonably necessary for the protection of one's own interest, the
interests of third persons or certain interests of the public." Id.
1
6 KEETON ET AL, supranote 6, at 827.
168See

id.
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which governs the qualified privilege principles for employment
references. 169 Under this Restatement, the prospective employer must
have an "important interest" in the information, and the former
employer must give the information only upon the request of the
prospective employer unless some relationship exists between the
parties. 170 Protected statements consist of information that relates to the
employee's or former employee's honesty and efficiency of her work, or
information that relates to the employee's future position with the
prospective employer.' 7'
Many states follow the Restatement by observing that employee
references are privileged provided that the employer does not abuse the
privilege 72 and employers respond to reference requests. 173 In other
words, qualified privilege does not protect all statements contained in
16 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 595 (1977).

"Protection of Interest of Recipient or a
Third Person" provides that statements are conditionally privileged or qualifiedly
privileged when:
(1)
An occasion makes a publication conditionally privileged if the
circumstances induce a correct or reasonable belief that
(a) there is information that affects a sufficiently important interest of
the recipient or a third person, and
(b) the recipient is one to whom the publisher is under a legal duty to
publish the defamatory matter or is a person to whom its
publication is otherwise within generally accepted standards of
decent conduct.
Id.
(2)
In determining whether a publication is within generally accepted
standards of decent conduct it is an important factor that
(a) the publication is made in response to a request rather than
volunteered by the publisher; or
(b) a family or other relationship exists between the parties..
Id. But see RESTATEMENTS (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 599-605A (1977). These series of
Restatements set forth the possible abuses of conditional privilege in which employers
could forfeit the common law qualified privilege defense.
170RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 595 (1977).
17 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 595 ant. i. Information having no connection with
the present employee's work or regarding the employee's future job with a prospective
employer are considered outside the scope of the privilege. Id.
17 See RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS §§ 595 to 605A; see infra notes 174-80 and
accompanying text.
173 Consistent with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 595(2)(a) (1977), courts generally
grant qualified privilege when the information is provided in response to a request rather
than the employer volunteering the information about an employee or former employee.
SMOLLA, supra note 65, at § 8.08 [2][b]. For instance, a former employer may not be
privileged to volunteer information that is true with respect to an employee's religious
beliefs. If, however, a prospective employer requests such information, then the privilege
may protect the former employer and permit disclosure of the information. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 595 ant. i (1977).
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references about former employees. After the employer has proven that
her statements made in a reference are protected by qualified privilege,
the burden shifts to the employee or former employee to prove that the
employer "abused" the privilege. 174 If a plaintiff proves that her
employer or former employer abused the privilege, then the employer
loses the privilege exposing itself to defamation liability. 175 In particular,
the employee may defeat the qualified privilege by showing the
following "abuse": 1) the prospective employer did not have an
important interest to be upheld; 176 2) the employer published
information about an employee or former employee with knowledge or
reckless disregard to the falsity of the defamatory statements; 1 ' 3) the
statements were neither limited to a necessary purpose nor made on the
proper occasion;178 4) the statements were not made in a proper
manner; 179 or 5) the employer excessively published the defamatory
statements.1s°

Unfortunately, prong two may pose a problem for the employee
when presenting her case to overcome the qualified privilege defense.
Jurisdictions differ with regard to which standard the employee must
prove in order to abrogate the qualified privilege defense, thus a court
may require the employee to prove some or all of these standards.18 1 For
instance, an employee may be required to show negligence, 8 2 common
law "ill-will malice," 183 or the New York Times "actual malice" 184 which is

174See, e.g., Olson v. 3M Company, 523 N.W.2d 578, 583 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994) (stating that
since 3M, the former employer, had a conditional privilege, the burden shifts to the
plaintiffs to affirmatively prove abuse of the privilege); Duffy v. Leading Edge Prod., Inc.,
44 F.3d 308,312 (5th Cir. 1995) (stating that when appealing the summary judgment motion
favoring the employer, the employee must prove that the employer acted with malice,
rather
than the employer prove the absence of malice).
75
1
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 595 iant. a; SMOLLA, supranote 65 § 8.0911].
76
1 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 595(1)(a).
17 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 600 - 602.
178
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 603 - 605A.
179Robert S. Adler & Ellen R. Peirce, Encourage Employers to Abandon Their "No Comment"
PoliciesRegardingJob Reference: A Reform Proposal,53 WASH. & LEE L.REv. 1381, 1409 (1996)
[hereinafter Adler & Peirce, EncourageEmployers].
1
80 See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 604.
181
See infra notes 182-87 and accompanying text.
182 SMOLLA, supra note 65, at § 8.09[4]. In the context of defeating a qualified privilege
defense, some courts have defined "negligence" as the lack of "probable cause" or
"reasonable belief" in the truth of a statement. Id.
180 . Lee Reed & Jan W. Henkel, Facilitatingthe Flow of Truthful PersonnelInformation: Some
Needed Change in the Standard Required to Overcome the Qualified Privilege to Defame, 26 AM.
Bus. L.J. 305, 313-15 (1988). The employee may overcome the qualified privilege under
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defined as "knowledge that it was false, or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not." 18s However, most jurisdictions with
common law qualified privilege require that employees defeat the
privilege by a showing of mere negligence, which resembles the
constitutional requirement established in Gertz.186 This requires the
plaintiff to merely prove that her employer lacked "probable cause" or
reasonable belief in the truthfulness of the statement when publishing
the statement. 187 Rodney Smolla, 18s however, convincingly argues that
requiring a mere negligence standard to defeat the employer's qualified
privilege establishes a "meaningless defense," because the court had
already subjected the employee to the negligence standard when the
employee presented the prima facie case for defamation.18 9 To avoid the
"meaningless defense," a growing number of jurisdictions are requiring
plaintiffs to show that their employer published the statement with
"knowledge that it was false, or with reckless disregard of whether it
was false or not." 19° Additionally, the Restatement's standard of malice
parallels the New York Times standard; therefore, the privilege would not
be a "meaningless defense" if a court follows the Restatement version. 191

common law "ill-will malice" if the employee proves that the employer was motivated by
her "ill will" or actual "spite" against the employee upon giving a reference. Id.
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279, 280 (1964) (defining "actual malice"
194
as knowledge that the statement published was "false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not").
15 Id.; see, e.g., Olson v. 3M Co., 523 N.W.2d 578, 583 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994) (requiring
plaintiff to establish abuse of privilege by showing that the employer had "knowledge or
reckless disregard as to falsity of defamatory matter."); Kass v. Great Coastal Express, Inc.,
676 A.D.2d 1099, 1106 (N.J. 1990) (declaring that in order to overcome a qualified privilege,
plaintiff must prove that the employer "knew the statement to be false or acted in reckless
disregard of its truth or falsity." The court noted that this standard is a much higher
standard and tougher to meet than the plaintiff's prima facie case for the tort of
defamation, which is a showing of mere negligence); Duffy v. Leading Edge Prod., Inc., 44
F.3d 308 (5th Cir. 1995) (stating that the plaintiff was required to show that the employer
abused the privilege based on the New York Times standard of "actual malice").
'8 SMOLLA, supra note 65, at § 8.09[4].
18 See id.
188Rodney Smolla is the author of the treatise LAW OF DEFAMATION (1997).
189In private figure cases, plaintiffs must already show a Gertz fault requirement as part of
their prima facie case, which renders the conditional privilege a "meaningless defense" that
adds nothing to the burden already imposed on the plaintiff. Smolla argues that by
imposing a less substantial Gertz fault requirement to defeat a conditional privilege
defense, Gertz will swallow up the conditional privilege defense. SMOLLA, supra note 65, at
§§ 8.07[31[a], 8.07 [3][c][i], and 8.09 [5].
19 See supra note 185; SMOLLA, supra note 65, at § 8.09 [5].
191Compare New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279, 280 (1964). The New York Times
Court defined "actual malice" as knowledge that the statement published was "false or
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Therefore, the courts would subject even private plaintiffs to the stricter
New York Times "actual malice" standard in order to overcome the
employer's qualified privilege defense.1 92
For instance, in Duffy v. Leading Edge Products, Inc.,193 the Fifth
Circuit Court imposed the "actual malice" standard for a former
employee seeking to overcome his employer's qualified privilege
defense. 194 In Duffy, an employer terminated an employee after learning
that the worker had sexually harassed two female co-workers.1 95 The
employee brought a "compelled self-publication" defamation cause of
action 96 against the employer, claiming that the employer could
reasonably foresee that he would be forced to reiterate the defamatory
reasons for his dismissal to prospective employers.197 The court in Duffy
had to determine which standard constituted "malice," either the
common law "ill will malice" or the more rigorous New York Times
"actual malice," to defeat the qualified privilege defense. 198 The court
ruled that under Texas law, the employee had to prove that at the time
the employer stated the reasons for discharge, the employer acted under
a New York Times "actual malice" standard. 19 Moreover, the employee
needed to demonstrate that his employer entertained serious doubts as
to the truth of the communication. 20 0 The court also concluded that the

with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." Id.; with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 600 (1977) which provides that:
"abuse" of the qualified privilege may be shown by: [O]ne who upon
an occasion giving rise to a conditional privilege publishes false and
defamatory matter concerning another abuses the privilege if he
(a) knows the matter to be false, or
(b) acts in reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity.
Id. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 600 (1977) cmt. b which clarifies, "reckless
disregard as to the truth or falsity exists when there is a high degree of awareness of
probable falsity or serious doubt as to the truth of the statement." Id.
192See supra note 185.
19 44 F.3d 308 (5th Cir. 1995).

19Duffy v. Leading Edge Prod., Inc., 44 F.3d 308, 313 (5th Cir. 1995). This federal case arose
out of the District Court for the Southern District of Texas. Based upon diversity of
citizenship, the federal court applied Texas law. Id. at 310.
15 Id.
at 311.

196See supra notes 82-92 and accompanying text.
Duffiy, 44 F.3d at 311.
9 Id. at 313-15. The Duffy court properly explained that the New York Times "actual malice"
standard is a higher standard than common law malice which may be proved by the
preponderance of evidence. Id. Under New York Times "actual malice" standard, however,
the plaintiff must provide dear and convincing proof to overcome the employer's qualified
privilege defense. Id. at 313.
19 Id.
at 314.
210Duffy v Leading Edge Prod., Inc., 44 F.3d 308, 314 (5th Cir. 1995).
197

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol33/iss2/7

Oliver: Opening the Channels of Communication Among Employers: Can Employ

1999]

OPENING THE CHANNELS

715

privilege is not lost if the employer actually believed the defamatory
statements to be true.20 1 In Duffy, the employer believed both women
claiming the employee had sexually harassed them to be sincere, and no
evidence indicated that the employer wrote the sexual harassment report
with a high degree of certainty that the facts disclosed by the women
were probably false. 202 The employee did not overcome the employer's
qualified privilege defense, because he failed to meet the New York Times
"actual malice" standard; hence, the Fifth Circuit Court dismissed the
case. 203
In addition, while some states like Texas recognize the common law
qualified privilege defense, other states have codified the common law
by constructing statutes that also protect employers against defamation
claims. 2° 4 Therefore, when asserting a qualified privilege defense,
employers are well advised to determine whether their particular state
follows a common law qualified privilege or whether the state has
enacted a statutory qualified privilege, also known as "good faith" job
reference laws. 205 Currently, at least twenty-nine states have adopted
statutory qualified privilege laws.2 6 Similar to the common law
qualified privilege, the statutory qualified privilege provides employers
with a defense against defamation claims brought by disgruntled
employees or former employees, encouraging employers to

Duffy, 44 F.3d at 314.
2WId.
2

2w

Id. at 315.

See infra note 206 and accompanying text. Forster, Good Faith Reference Laws, supra note
15, at 6402, availablein 1996 WL 363324 (reporting that state legislatures have passed bills to
protect employers against defamation claims when they provide "good faith" job
references to prospective employers).
2
wForster, Good Faith Reference Laws, supra note 15, at 6402.
2m ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.160 (Michie 1996); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1361 (West Supp.
1996); CAL Civ. CODE § 47(c) (West Supp. 1997); COLO.REy. STAT § 8-2-114 (Supp. 1996);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19 § 708 (Supp. 1996); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.095 (West. Supp. 1997);
GA. CODE ANN. § 34-1-4 (Supp. 1996); IDAHO CODE § 44-201 (Michie 1996); 745 ILL. COM.
STAT. ANN. 46.10 (West Supp. 1997); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-5-3-1 (West Supp. 1997); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 4 4 -19 9 a (West Supp. 1997); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:291 (West Supp. 1997);
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. TiT. 26 § 598 (West Supp. 1996); MD. CODE ANN. § 5-423 (Michie 1997);
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 423.452 (West Supp. 1997); NEB.REV. ST. § 48-2304 (1998); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 50-12-1 (Michie Supp. 1996); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-539.12 (1997); N.D. CENT. CODE §
2

34-02-18 (Supp. 1997); OIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4113.71 (Banks-Baldwin Supp. 1998); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 40 § 61 (West Supp. 1997); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.178 (Supp. 1996); R.L GEN.
LAWS § 28-6.4-1 (Supp. 1996); S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-1-65 (Law Co-op. Supp. 1996); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 60-4-12 (Michie 1998); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1-105 (Supp. 1998); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 34-42-1 (Supp. 1996); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.487 (West 1997); WYo. STAT.
ANN. § 27-1-113 (Michie Supp. 1996).
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communicate employment information to prospective employers.2°7
According to a 1996 Wall Street Journal article, state legislatures have
designed "good faith" reference laws to encourage companies to reevaluate their "no comment" and neutral job reference policies in order
to provide a safer and more efficient workplace. 208 However, these laws
do not legally require companies to disclose a former employee's past
violent behavior. 2°9 Thus, in order to ensure disclosure of information,
this Note proposes that these laws should obligate employers to disclose
special information such as a former employee's violent behavior, while
at the same time, the employers will remain immune from defamation
liability. 210
Furthermore, most of these statutes presume that the employer has
acted in "good faith" upon disclosing information about an employee to
an inquiring prospective employer. 211 Similar to the common law
qualified privilege defense, under most statutes, the employee may rebut
the presumption of "good faith" by demonstrating that the employer
"abused" the privilege in order to recover damage awards for
defamation. 212 However, states differ on their approach in determining
"abuse" on the part of the employer, because the statutes impose
different standards of proof and provide various meanings to the
definition of "malice" for the employee to overcome the qualified
privilege. 213 For instance, while fifteen states require a showing of a
preponderance of the evidence that the employer abused the qualified

2

w

20

Forster, Good Faith Reference Laws, supra note 15, at 6402.
McMorris, supra note 8, at B1.
See id.; see also Barry S. Shanoff, New Regs Reduce Employee Reference Liability, WORLD

WAsrEs, Sept. 1, 1996, at 19 availablein 1996 WL 9605417.
210 See infra part V for proposed model statute, which imposes a duty on employers to
disclose a former employee's past criminal behavior, violent tendencies, dangerous
propensities, and past sexual misconduct.
211 26 statutes out of the 29 expressly state or imply that a presumption of "good faith"
exists. The only three statutes which do not provide for this language are the following.
CAL CIV. CODE § 47(c) (West Supp. 1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-199a (Supp. 1996); and
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-539.12 (1997).
212 See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 768.095 (West. Supp. 1997) (stating that the employer's
"presumption of good faith is rebutted upon a showing that the information disclosed by
the former employer was knowingly false or deliberately misleading... [or] rendered with
malicious purpose..."). See also 745 ILL. COM. STAT. ANN. 46.10 (West Supp. 1997) (stating
that the presumption of good faith "may be rebutted by a preponderance of evidence that
the information disclosed was knowingly false...").
213 A problem arises with the term "malice" because a number of states use the term in
different ways. See Adler & Peirce, Encourage Employers, supra note 179, at 1453. See infra
notes 214-16 and accompanying text.
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privilege, 214 seven other states require the employee to show abuse by a
higher standard of clear and convincing evidence. 215 Seven states do not
explicitly state the standard of proof needed in order to overcome the
statutory qualified privilege defense. 216 In addition, unlike some
common law qualified privilege approaches, none of the "good faith" job
reference statutes impose a mere negligence standard on the employee to
defeat the employer's qualified privilege defense. 217 Therefore, these
statutes require the employee to show "malice" on the part of the
employer preserving the employer's qualified privilege defense and
avoiding the "meaningless defense." 21 8 Different states use this term
"malice" in various ways-referring to either the common-law ill will
malice21 9 or the New York Times "actual malice," 220 but that discussion is
beyond the scope of this article. 221

214 Proof by

"preponderance of the evidence" means that it is more probable than not that a
contested fact exists. 1 CHARLES TnxLORD MCCORMICK, MCCORMUCK ON EvIDENcE 575 (John
W. Strong et al. eds. 4th ed. 1992). Statutes that require employees to demonstrate "abuse"
of the privilege by a "preponderance of the evidence" include the following. ALASKA STAT.
§ 09.65.160 (Michie 1996); COLO.REV. STAT § 8-2-114 (Supp. 1996); GA. CODE ANN. § 34-1-4
(Supp. 1996); 745 ILL COM. STAT. ANN. 46.10 (West Supp. 1997); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-5-3-1
(West Supp. 1997); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:291 (West Supp. 1997); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1539.12 (1997); N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-02-18 (Supp. 1997); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 423.452 (West
Supp. 1997); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4113.71 (Banks-Baldwin Supp. 1997); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 40 § 61 (West Supp. 1997); OR. REv. STAT. § 30.178 (Supp. 1996); R.I. GEN. LAws §
28-6.4-1 (Supp. 1996); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1-105 (Supp. 1996); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 27-1113 (Michie Supp. 1996).
215 Proof by "clear and convincing evidence" is a higher burden of proof than
"preponderance of the evidence." A burden of "clear and convincing evidence" means that
a jury must be persuaded that the truth of a fact is "highly probable." Strong et al., supra
note 214, at 575-76. Statutes that require employees to demonstrate abuse of the privilege
by a "clear and convincing evidence" include the following: FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.095
(West Supp. 1997); IDAHO CODE § 44-201 (Supp. 1996); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. Trr. 26 § 598
(West Supp. 1996); MD. CODE ANN. § 5-423 (Supp. 1997); S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-1-65 (Law
Co-op. Supp. 1996); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-42-1 (Supp. 1996); WLS. STAT. ANN. § 895.487

(West 1997).
Statutes that fail to provide guidance for determining which standard of proof is
applicable to overcome a qualified privilege defense include the following. ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 23-1361 (West Supp. 1996); CAL. CIrV. CODE § 47(c) (West Supp. 1997); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 19 § 708 (Supp. 1996); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-119a (Supp. 1996); NEB. REV. ST.
§ 48-2304 (1998); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50-12-1 (Michie Supp. 1996); S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-1-65
(Law Co-op. Supp. 1996).
21
216

7

See supranote 206.

218 See supra

219

note 206; see supra note 189 and accompanying text.

See supranote 183.

nD See supra note 184.
221See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
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To summarize, employers should be less fearful when giving out
references if they abide by the following defenses: tell the truth, give an
honest opinion, or obtain employee consent.222 Most importantly,
employers should consider the qualified privilege defense to defamation
when deciding to adopt more open reference practices that convey full
223
and complete references about their employees or former employees.
Ironically, employers may be creating more legal problems if they choose
to adopt no-comment reference polices, neutral polices, or policies that
give only favorable information to prospective employers. 224 Under a
negligent misrepresentation theory, for instance, a former employer may
be required to disclose information in order to protect a prospective
employer or third parties if the former employer gives a favorable
reference and omits negative information, such as an employee's violent
behavior. 22
Further, failing to disclose information could lead to
negligent hiring liability for prospective employers. 226 Hence, employers
should be less worried about defamation suits and more concerned with
failing to disclose all relevant information that reveals potential harm to
prospective employers or third parties. After discussing the elements of
defamation and the defenses to defamation in an employment setting, an
explanation of other torts that may affect the employer's decision in
determining whether to give references needs to be addressed as well.

2n See supra notes 127-57 and accompanying text.
22W See supra notes 158-221 and accompanying text. McMorris, supra note 8, at B1 (reporting
that some companies changed their "no comment" policies after their particular state
adopted [qualified privilege] laws that make it more difficult for former employees to win
lawsuits over negative job references).
224 A growing trend reflects that companies are suing former employers who failed to
provide references alerting them to problems with an employee, particularly if the worker
had demonstrated violent behavior. Courts are increasingly naming this as negligent
referencing. Saltzman, Shouldn't Fret So Much, supra note 52; see also McMorris, supra note 8,
at B1 (referring to a Vice President's statements that his company verifies only dates of
employment, and is considering changing its policy because of the new California law
presented by Randi W. and the Allstate case).
225 See infra notes 230-48 and accompanying text. See part W. This part explains the
expanded tort liability imposed on employers who give favorable references but fail to
disclose information, which would have prevented substantial foreseeable risks to
unknown third parties.
226 See infra notes 318-40 and accompanying text. See also Paul W. Barada, Check Please:
Thorough Reference Checking Should Be Central to the Hiring Process, FIN. PLAN., Sept. 1, 1998,
available in 1998 WL 11190514 (stating that checking references reduces the employer's
potential liability for negligent hiring claims).
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Background of Other Torts and Title VII Retaliatory Reference Claims

Employers should also have a working knowledge of other torts,
which may seem to conflict with the law of defamation and Title VII.
The law of defamation directs employers to give neutral, positive, or no
information regarding a former employee's job performance in the
interest of preventing an employee from bringing a defamation claim. 227
However, for the torts of negligent misrepresentation and intentional
misrepresentation, employers may be required to disclose negative
information about an employee and may be penalized for giving a
neutral or positive reference. 228 By understanding these torts and
statutory obligations, employers may properly discard "no comment"
and neutral reference policies and tailor their new reference policies in
order to open the channels of communication among employers. 229
Thus, the fundamental concepts behind negligent misrepresentation,
intentional misrepresentation, and Title VII retaliatory claims must be
discussed.
1.

Negligent Misrepresentation

An individual owes no duty to warn others who are threatened by a
third party's conduct absent a "special relationship" between that
individual and other parties according to Restatement (Second) of Torts
section 315.m Generally, in order to prove negligent misrepresentation,
under Restatement (Second) of Torts section 311, 23 1 a plaintiff must prove

w See supra notes 11-15. See supranotes 50-51 and accompanying text.
See infra part I.
n9Richard J. Reibstein, Cal frnia Supreme Court Recognition of Common Law Claim Based on
FavorableJob Reference Could Put Employers Nationwide Between a Rock and a Hard Place, NAT'L
L.J., Mar., 10, 1997, at B5 (stating, "one way to minimize or eliminate the risk of liability is
to include a legally sufficient reservation or qualification in an employment reference. In
drafting such reservations, or qualifications, both the law of defamation and the law of
misrepresentation must be taken into consideration").
230RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTs § 315 (1965) provides:
2

There is no duty to control the conduct of a third person as to prevent
him from causing physical harm to another unless
(a) a special relation exists between the actor and the third person
which imposes a duty upon the actor to control the third person's
conduct, or

(b)

a special relation exists between the actor and the other which
gives to the other a right to protection.

Id.
231RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF TORTS § 311 (1965) involves negligent conduct and provides

that.
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that the individual owed a duty not to misrepresent the truth because
this theory is a negligence-based tort.232 Further, prospective employers,
employees, or injured third parties must also prove that they reasonably
relied on the past employer's statements, and that these
misrepresentations proximately caused their injuries. 233 Similar to these
Restatements, courts have not yet imposed a blanket duty on the part of
former employers to disclose negative information about a former
employee to prospective employers when no special relationship exists
between the parties.2 4
However, some courts, like California and Florida, have carved out
exceptions - to the "no duty" to disclose rule, holding that former
employers have a duty to disclose information to prospective employers
when employers give a favorable reference but fail to disclose negative
information, such as a former employee's dangerous propensities. 236

(1)

(2)

One who negligently gives false information to another is subject to

liability for physical harm caused by action taken by the other in
reasonable reliance upon such information, where such harm results
(a) to the other, or
(b) to such third persons as the actor should expect to be put in peril
by the action taken.
Such negligence may consist of failure to exercise reasonable care
(a) in ascertaining the accuracy of the information, or
(b)

in the manner in which it is communicated.

Id.
= Id. See also Garcia v. Superior Court, 789 P.2d 960,963-64 (Cal. 1990).
See supra note 231.
234See, e.g., Moore v. St. Joseph Nursing Home, Inc., 459 N.W.2d 100 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990)
(holding that a former employer had no duty to disclose information about a former
employee's violent behavior to a prospective employer); Cohen v. Wales, 133 A.D.2d 94
(N.Y. App. Div. 1986) (holding that a former employer had no duty to disclose information
to a prospective employer regarding a teacher's past sexual misconduct with a student); see
also Adler & Peirce, Encourage Employers, supra note 179, at 1417 (stating that courts have
not established a blanket duty on the former employer to disclose information about a
former employee to prospective employers); KEETON Er AL., supra note 6, at 737 (stating
that as a general rule, the deceit action will not be recognized for a tacit nondisclosure).
m Courts have carved out exceptions to the general rule that the non-disclosure of facts has
no cause of action. Courts create a duty by observing "the importance of the fact not
disclosed." KEmON ET AL., supra note 6, at 737-39.
m See, e.g., Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified Sch. Dist, 929 P.2d 582,593 (Cal. 1997); Gutzan
v. Altair Airlines, 776 F.2d 135, 139 (3d Cir. 1985); Garcia v. Superior Court, 789 P.2d 960
(Cal. 1990). In Garcia,the California Supreme Court held that a parole officer had a duty of
reasonable care to disclose information to a third party regarding a parolee's threat to end
the third party's life. Id. at 961. The officer told the victim that she had nothing to worry
about and that he would not come looking for her. Id. However, the parolee told the
officer that he would kill her if he found her. Id. at 963. The parolee acted on this threat by
kidnapping and then shooting the victim. Id. The court reasoned that since the parole
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This exception to the general rule was formed through the expansion of
the tort of negligent misrepresentation.23 7 A few courts have extended
the application of negligent misrepresentation to employers who knew
or should have realized that the safety of others may depend on the
accuracy of the information.m Courts have held employers liable for
negligent misrepresentation regardless of the existence of a special
relationship between the employer and prospective employer or third
parties. 239 Thus, an alternative method in measuring a negligent act is to
regard negligence as an act or omission that would be avoided by a
reasonable person who would consider the safety of others. 240 Also,
when carving out an exception to the "no duty" rule, courts have
considered the foreseeability of harm, public policy, moral blame, and
social requirements. 241
For instance, the employees as well as injured third parties in Randi
W. v. Muroc Joint Unified School District,242 Jerner v. Allstate Insurance
Company,243 and Gutzan v. Altair Airlines, Inc.244 asserted negligent
misrepresentation actions against former employers for their injuries or
injuries sustained by deceased family members as a result of the former
employers' omissions in their employment references. 245 In these cases,
the former employers gave recommendations for a potentially
dangerous former employee but failed to disclose these dangerous

officer chose to communicate information to the third person, he owed a reasonable duty to
speak truthfully even though no "special relationship" existed between the two parties. Id.
at 964. The court also determined that he either knew or should have known that the
victim's safety might depend on the accuracy of the information. Id.
237 See, e.g., Randi W., 929 P.2d at 591; Gutzan, 776 F.2d at 139; Garcia, 789 P.2d at 964.
2mLd. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 311 cmt. b (1965). This comment
provides, "[§ 311] extends to any person who, in the course of an activity which is in
furtherance of his own interests, undertakes to give information to another, and knows or
should realize that the safety of others may depend upon the accuracy of the information."
Id.
2See supra note 237.
240
See Gutzan v. Altair Airlines, 776 F.2d 135, 139 (3d Cir. 1985).
241Malorney v. B & L Motor Freight, Inc. 496 N.E.2d 1086 (111. App. Ct. 1986); see also Randi
W. v. Muroc Joint Unified Sch. Dist., 929 P.2d 582,588 (Cal. 1997).
2- 929 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1997).
243
Fla. Cir. Ct. No. 93-09472 (1993).
2- 766 F.2d 135 (3d Cir. 1985).
245See infra part IV. These cases are discussed in greater detail in part IV. Part IV
distinguishes employment reference-related cases between states which hold former
employers liable for giving a neutral or positive recommendation while not disclosing
negative facts and states that do not hold former employers liable under these
circumstances.
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propensities to prospective employers.246 For example, in both the Randi
W. and Gutzan opinions, the courts held the former employers liable for
negligent misrepresentation when they omitted facts in a
recommendation even though no special relationship existed between
the former employer and the injured third parties. 247 Disclosure of these
facts could have prevented a substantial risk of foreseeable physical
injury to the employees at the new workplace. 248
Negligent
misrepresentation liability has been a more common source of litigation
for
former employers;
however,
exposure
to
intentional
misrepresentation liability has also given employers something to
consider when they omit information in a job reference.
2.

Intentional Misrepresentation

Unlike negligent misrepresentation, intentional misrepresentation
does not require a duty of care analysis in determining liability. 249
According to Restatement (Second) of Torts section 310,M employers
who make a misrepresentation in a reference may be held liable to a
victim for her physical injuries if the misrepresentations lead a
prospective employer to rely on the truth of that information and to the
employer's subsequent hiring of a dangerous employee. 251 More
specifically, the former employer must intend to induce action or realize
that his statement would induce action by the prospective employer,
which would place an unreasonable risk of physical harm to others. 252
Former employees or third parties must show the element of intent by
246 See id.

247See

id.

Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified Sch. Dist., 929 P.2d 582,591 (Cal. 1997); Gutzan v. Altair
Airlines, 776 F.2d 135 (3d Cir. 1985).
249 Randi W., 929 P.2d at 587.
20
w RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) Op ToRTs § 310 (1965) involves intentional conduct or fraud and
provides that:
An actor who makes a misrepresentation is subject to liability to
another for physical harm which results from an act done by the other
or a third person in reliance upon the truth of the representation, if the
actor
(a) intends his statement to induce or should realize that it is likely to
induce action by the other, or a third person, which involves an
unreasonable risk of physical harm to the other, and
(b) knows
(i) that the statement is false, or
(ii) that he has not the knowledge which he professes.
Id.
21 Id.; see also Randi W., 929 P.2d at 593.
m See supra note 250.
248
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proving that the former employer knew that the statements she
conveyed to the prospective employer were false, or that the former
employer did not have the knowledge that she claimed to have had
when making such statements. 2m According to William Prosser and W.
Page Keeton, the culpability of "intent" means the "intent to deceive, to
mislead, [or] to convey false impression." 254 Furthermore, the reliance
factor for intentional misrepresentation would be met in cases where a
prospective employer hires a dangerous employee and a third party
becomes a victim of that employee; the third party need not rely on the
statements made in the reference. 5 In other words, the authors of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts section 310 intended for the doctrine of
intentional misrepresentation to apply to cases in which third parties are
endangered by the misrepresentation.2 5- 6
In short, a former employer has no affirmative duty to respond to
reference requests from prospective employers. 257 However, when a
former employer chooses to respond to a prospective employer's
reference request, and the former employer negligently or intentionally
omits material information about a former employee's unfavorable
characteristics, then the former employer risks being subject to potential
liability for misrepresentation brought by an unknown third party. 2
Therefore, employers should properly consider defamation, negligent
misrepresentation, and intentional misrepresentation when drafting
more open reference policies. One final consideration that employers
should observe with regard to reference information is Title VII
retaliatory claims. The landmark United States Supreme Court case,
Robinson v. Shell Oil Co.,259 brings new liability to employers who give

2
MSee
25

id.
Intent involves that a representation will be made, that the representation is directed to a
certain person or class or persons, the representation shall convey a certain meaning, it will
be
believed, and acted upon. KEETON ET AL, supranote 6, at 74.
2
0 Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified Sch. Dist., 929 P.2d 582,593 (Cal. 1997).
26 Id.

See RESrATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTs § 310 ant. c (1965) which provides, "A
misrepresentation may be [made] not only toward a person whose conduct it is intended to
influence but also toward all others whom the maker should recognize as likely to be
imperiled by action taken in reliance upon his misrepresentation." Id.
257
See supra note 234 and accompanying text.
m Saxton, Flaws in the Laws, supra note 9, at 66; see supra notes 230-56 and accompanying
text.
-5 519 U.S. 337, 117 S. Ct. 843 (1997).
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negative references to subsequent employers regarding their former
employees. 26°
3. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co. Expands Former Employer's Liability
Under Title VII
The Supreme Court rendered a landmark decision that holds an
employer liable when giving a negative reference in retaliation of a
former employee who had previously filed a Title VII discrimination
claim against the employer. 261 Unfortunately, the decision of Robinson v.
Shell Oil Co. 26 2 supports company decisions to retain "no comment" or
neutral job reference practices. 263 In fact, employment lawyers believe
inability to
that this decision will exacerbate the prospective employer's
264
obtain useful information concerning job applicants.
In Robinson, Shell Oil fired an employee from his sales position, and
shortly thereafter, the employee filed a Title VHI265 claim alleging that he

26

0 David C. Wilkes, Negative Job References May Now Expose Employers to Title VII Liability,
LMG. NEWS, Sept. 1997, at 1-2 [hereinafter Wilkes].
261 Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337 (1997).

519 U.S. 337 (1997).
23Wilkes, supra note 260, at 1 (stating that the United States Supreme Court has sanctioned
2

a new class of lawsuits against employers who give negative references concerning former
employees).
24

Id.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e et. seq. (1994); see also MARK A. ROTHSTEIN & LANCE LIEBMAN,
EMPLOYMENT LAw 225 (3d ed. 1994) [hereinafter RoTHsmTEIN & LIEBMAN]. Congress enacted
265

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, primarily to eliminate racial discrimination in the
workplace and also to prohibit such discrimination in the social and economic arenas. Id.
Presently, however, Title Vii's protection against employment discrimination covers many
classes including race, color, creed, sex, religion and national origin. Id. Title VII applies to
public and private employers with fifteen or more employees. Id. at 226. See also Americans
with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1994) (prohibiting discrimination based on
disability) and Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1994) (prohibiting
discrimination based on age). In addition, the essential language under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 that prohibits discrimination in the workplace provides:
It shall be unlawful employment practice for an employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect
his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994).
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had been fired because of his race. 266 While the case was pending, the
employee applied for another job with a different employer.267 The
prospective employer contacted Shell Oil, the former employer, to secure
an employment reference; and Shell Oil replied by giving a negative
reference. 268 The former employee brought a retaliatory discrimination
action under Title VII section 704(a), 269 contending that Shell Oil gave a
negative reference in retaliation for having previously filed the Title VII
claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC").270

The Supreme Court held that a former employer may be found
liable under Title VIl's retaliatory discrimination provision if the former
employer gave a negative reference in retaliation of a former employee
having previously filed a Title VII discrimination claim with the EEOC
against the employer.271 The Supreme Court reasoned that the reach of

26Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337,339 (1997).
2V Id.

26Id.
26942 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (1994). This section of Title VII has been labeled the "anti-retaliation
discriminatory provision," whereby an employer, with fifteen or more employees, may not
retaliate against an employee for filing a Title VII claim by firing the employee or demoting
the employee. Section 704(a) of Title VII provides:
It shall be unlawful employment practice for an employer to
discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for
employment, for an employment agency, or joint labor-management
committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining,
including on-the-job training programs, to discriminate against any
individual, or for a labor organization to discriminate against any
member thereof or applicant for membership, because he has opposed
any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this
subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or
participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing
under this subchapter.
Id.
270
Robinson, 519 U.S. at 339. Note that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission or
"EEOC" is the federal agency responsible for enforcing Title VII. An employee or
complainant must first file a Title VII claim with the EEOC, then the EEOC conducts an
investigation. The EEOC must issue the employee or complainant a "right to sue" letter.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1994) for enforcement provisions.
m Robinson, 519 U.S. at 346. In Robinson, the Supreme Court, per Justice Clarence Thomas,
resolved the conflict among the circuit courts regarding the question of whether Section
704(a) of Title VII retaliatory section's statement of the word "employees" included former
employees. Id. Before the Robinson opinion, some circuit courts held that the word
"employee" included only current employees, thus only current employees, and not former
employees, would be able to bring a charge for retaliation under Title VII. Id. at 346. For
example, a current employee could file a retaliatory discrimination charge against his
employer if the employer fired him in retaliation of his having previously filed a Title VII
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the Title VII retaliatory provision extended to both current employees
and former employees, because the exclusion of former employees from
the anti-retaliation provision would permit employers to engage in postemployment retaliation that would deter victims of discrimination from
filing a cause of action under Title VII.272
The Robinson decision suggests that employers should maintain
their "no comment" policies or polices that reveal only the name and
dates of employment in order to protect themselves from a Title VII
retaliation claim brought by a disgruntled former employee. 273
Consequently, former employers will be even more reluctant to warn
prospective employers about an applicant's past violent behavior or
dangerous propensities because of the new potential liability imposed on
employers.274 Employers may attempt to protect themselves from Title
VII retaliation claims regarding negative references by requiring former
employees to sign a waiver releasing the employer from negative

discrimination claim with the EEOC. However, a former employee would have no cause of
action for an employer who retaliates against him if the retaliation occurred after the
employee had been terminated from his job. See, e.g., Veprinsky v. Flour Daniel, Inc., 87
F.3d 881 (7th Cir. 1996). In contrast, other circuit courts have ruled in the past that the
word "employee" included not only current employees but also former employees.
Therefore, these circuit courts held that a former employee could sue his former employer
claiming that his former employer acted in retaliation for the employee previously filing a
Title VII discriminatory charge. See, e.g., Bailey v. USX Corp., 850 F.2d 1506,1509 (11th Cir.
1988); Charlton v. Paramus Bd. of Educ., 25 F.3d 194,198 (3rd Cir. 1994).
2Rbinson, 519 U.S. at 346. The Supreme Court also determined that Congress could have
used the words "current employees" to denote that only current employees could file a
retaliatory discrimination claim with the EEOC. Id. at 846. However, since Congress used
the word "employees" in this section, it did not intend to limit the law to only current
employees, but rather Congress designed the law to be applicable to former employees as
well. Id.
23 Frumkin & Santangelo, Title VII, supra note 10, at 52. The Robinson decision provides
another reason for employers to refrain from giving substantive references as a matter of
policy. Id.; Wilkes, supra note 260, at 1-2 (quoting Herbert E. Gerson, Co-Chair of the
Section of Litigation's Employment and Labor Relations Law Committee, "I would think
that with [the Robinson] opinion, the message is 'don't tell anyone anything about former
employees'").
24 Wilkes, supra note 260, at 2; Stephanie Armour, EEOC Sets Guidelines to Fend Off
Retaliation, USA TODAY, May 27, 1998, at 03B. This article reports that there has been a
sharp increase in retaliation complaints with the EEOC. Id. "Claims have jumped from
about 7,900 in fiscal year 1991 to more than 18,100 [in 1997]." Id.
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reference suits.275 However, the EEOC usually frowns upon such
releases under Title VII.276
This discussion addressed the fundamental elements of defamation,
the defenses to defamation in an employment context, and other torts
that employees, former employees or third parties may bring against
employers as a result of a reference given by that employer. A solid
understanding of these torts and the new Title VII retaliation liability
should assist employers when adopting more open reference practices
and discarding their "no comment" neutral job reference practices.
In addition, employers should take note that the problem of
277
defamation with regard to references seems to be unwarranted.
Employers shall find that a much greater problem lies with the adoption
of "no comment" and neutral job reference schemes, because these
practices may contribute to workplace assaults and homicides as well as
increase the possibility of negligent hiring claims against prospective
employers. 278 Therefore, a more comprehensive explanation of "no
comment" and neutral job reference policies and their socially
undesirable effects is essential to illustrate how such practices may
contribute to violence in the workplace.

II. THE NEGATVE EFFEcrs OF "No CoMMENT"

AND NEUTRAL JOB

REFERENCE POLICIES

Employers have adopted "no-comment" reference policies or
neutral job references for their businesses primarily to avoid litigation
involving defamation.27 9 Specifically, employers fear that if they include
negative information in a reference, such as a former employee's
dangerous behavior in the workplace, then the former employee could
bring a claim of defamation.280 As already indicated, employers may
now be held liable for Title VII retaliatory claims for giving negative

id.; Frumkin &. Santangelo, Title VII, supra note 10, at 52 (contending that as a result
of the Robinson decision, employers will require a general release from employees as a
275See

condition precedent to obtaining a full and complete reference).
276Wilkes, supra note 260, at 2.
7 See infra part M.A.
2 28
See infra notes 310-40 and accompanying text.
2m9See supra notes 7-17 and accompanying text. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying

text.
nO See supra notes 7-17 and accompanying text. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying

text.
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references regarding employees or former employees who have
previously filed a Title VII discrimination suit against their employers. 281
On the other hand, employers may be held liable for negligent
misrepresentation 2 2 if they choose to give positive references while
failing to reveal criminal or violent conduct of former employees. 28 As a
result of the potential liability for these claims, attorneys have advised
their corporate clients to give little or no information to inquiring
prospective employers. 284 Although this advice may deter some
litigation for employers, this Note contends that it may add to the
problem of violence in the workplace, because prospective employers are
unable to obtain sufficient information about a job applicant who may be
28
violent, dangerous, or criminal. 5
A.

The Employer's Fear of Defamation Claims Involving References Is
Unwarranted

Employers believe that defamation claims regarding negative
references may pose a serious threat to their business; however, this
belief seems to be unfounded. Between 1985 and 1990, only twelve
employment-related defamation cases involving references were filed in
federal and state courts. 286 Despite this data, employers have observed a
few high-profile cases with million-dollar jury awards making the

28 1

2
20

2

Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337,346 (1997).
See supra notes 230-48 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 230-48 and accompanying text See infra part IV.

" Kenny, supra note 9, at I (stating that lawyers recommend that their clients adopt tightlipped policies who are concerned about being sued for providing negative or misleading
information regarding a current or former employee); Anne Lewis, References: An
Employer's Dilemma (visited Feb. 13, 1998) <http://www.fryberger.com/referenc.htm>.
Many businesses fear possible defamation claims should they give negative information
about former employees, thus on the advice of their attorneys, many employers have a
policy to say nothing to prospective employers, except an employee's dates of
employment. Id. For the past decade, attorneys have advised employers not to provide
references because a former employee might sue over defamation. Bahls & Bahls, supra
note 142. Employers are reluctant to give any information beyond name and employment
dates in fear of discrimination and defamation suits. See also Saxton, Flaws in The Laws,
supra note 9, at 45.
2 See infra notes 310-40 and accompanying text.
2m Paetzold & Willborn, supra note 67, at 135 (reporting that in 1990, 118 employmentrelated defamation cases were filed in federal and state courts, and of these cases, only 12
cases involved references); see also Saltzman, Shouldn't Fret So Much, supra note 52 (asserting
that in the mid-eighties only a handful of high-profile defamation cases against employers
gave job references a bad name).
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headlines, such as Frank B. Hall & Co., Inc. v. Buck, 287 and their attorneys
have advised them not to provide references, fearing that former
employees would sue their previous employers for defamation.2 With
only a handful of employment defamation suits involving references
filed in the late eighties, the creation of "no comment" reference policies
and neutral references may have been unwarranted. 2'
Furthermore, employers should remember that the "truth" is an
absolute defense for defamation. 29°
Therefore, employers, who
document incidents and tell the truth about a former employee's violent
behavior in the workplace, will not be held liable for defamation. 29'
Alternatively, even though the "truth" of a particular event may become
a disputed factual issue for the jury to decide, employers who give
negative references regarding a former employee's violent behavior may
claim that the statements made to prospective employers are protected
under a common law qualified privilege or statutory "good faith"
reference laws. 292
Nevertheless, commentators argue that the costs and expense of
defending defamation lawsuits have caused most employers to be
reluctant in supplying complete and detailed references. 293 Particularly,

w Frank B. Hall & Co., Inc. v. W. Buck, 678 S.W.2d 612 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984). A jury

awarded a former employee $1.9 million against a former employer for defamation
regarding a reference. Id. at 630. See supra notes 108-16 and accompanying text for a
discussion on Frank B. Hall & Co., Inc. case. See also Bahls & Bahls, supra note 142 (referring
to an Ohio attorney who said that many companies were already refusing to provide
references out of concern for defamation suits).
28 Employers were fearful that they would be sued for millions of dollars, thus they
stopped handing out references or limited information as to a worker's name, position, and
dates of employment. Saltzman, Shouldn't FretSo Much, supra note 52. For the past decade,
employers have received advice from their attorneys to not give references because a
former employee might sue for defamation. Bahls & Bahls, supra note 142.
289
Paetzold & Willborn contend that employer behavior of adopting "no comment" policies
is irrational because the number of defamation cases regarding employment references is
small, privileges in defamation law provide that plaintiffs seldom win any award, and the
size of awards has declined over time. Paetzold & Willborn, supranote 67, at 124. See also
Saltzman, Shouldn't Fret So Much, supra note 52 (expressing that employers had "little
reason to fear that providing an honest reference of a former employee would spark legal
action").
m See supra note 127 and accompanying text; Barada, supra note 226.
291
JACOBS & KOCH, supra note 45, at 281.
292
See supra notes 158-221 and accompanying text; Furfaro & Josephson, Workplace Violence
PartII, supra note 11, at 3.
293
Kimberly Lambert Love & Mary L Lohrke, Employer Defamation: The Role of Qualifd
Privilege and the Impact of New Employer Reference Checking Legislation (visited Feb. 13, 1998)
<http://www.glastar.com/-radrob/employer.html> (stating that employers are reluctant

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1999

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 33, No. 2 [1999], Art. 7

730 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33
employers may be protected from defamation by stating the "truth" as a
defense or by asserting a qualified privilege defense; however, former
employees could file a defamation lawsuit against them regardless of
this protection when employers decide to freely discuss negative aspects
of the employees' past performance. 294 Therefore, the expense of
litigation alone deters employers from communicating to prospective
employers that former employees displayed violent behavior. 295
This Note provides three responses to these counter arguments in
support of employers discarding "no comment" polices and beginning
the practice of open communication. First, many companies could
acquire business liability insurance to shield them from various tort
claims like defamation and negligent misrepresentation among others. 296
Second, if an employer's statements are found to be protected under a
qualified privilege, then as a matter of law, the case could be dismissed
in an early proceeding such as a summary judgment motion.297 Thus,
litigation would not be too costly for the former employer because the
case could end early in the litigation process. 298 Additionally, this Note
proposes a model statute showing that the employer who abused the
privilege is judged as a matter of law, thus possibly dismissing the case
without a long jury trial.299

to give detailed employee references because of the potential liability and cost of defending
defamation lawsuits).
2"See id.
m See id.

2

% Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified Sch. Dist., 929 P.2d 582, 589 (Cal. 1997). The Randi W.
court concluded that employers could acquire business liability insurance to cover claims
of negligent misrepresentation, but not for intentional misconduct such as fraud. Id.
m See, e.g., Duffy v. Leading Edge Prods., 44 F.3d 308, 312 (5th Cir. 1995). The Duffy court
granted summary judgment in favor of the former employer and against a former
employee who brought a compelled self-publication defamation charge against the former
employer. Id. The court concluded that the "truth" defense and the qualified privilege
defense protected the employer from defamation liability Id.; Olson v. 3M Co., 523 N.W.2d
578, 582 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994). The Olson court granted summary judgment in favor of the
employer, holding that the former employer had a conditional privilege to issue a press
release and make statements to its employees and the press regarding a former employee's
assaults and harassment at work. Id.; Boehm v. American Bankers Ins. Group, Inc., 557 So.
2d 91 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990). The Boehm court found that a former employer's statements
did not constitute an "abuse" under a qualified privilege defense when it responded to an
executive agent's private inquiry. Id. The court found that the former employer's
statements, which revealed that its former employee was or might be a homosexual and
that this fact caused an $8 million loss to the former employer was protected under
qualified privilege. Id.
2
% See e.g., Duff-y, 44 F.3d at 312; Olson, 523 N.W.2d at 582.
2
99 See infra part V for proposed statute.
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Finally, former employers also take on the role of prospective
employers who must seek out job applicants in order to fulfill
employment positions."a° Thus, employers who have "no comment"
policies which reveal nothing about an employee to other companies will
become frustrated when they, as prospective employers, begin searching
for potential employees.301 Moreover, employers could discover that
other employers have adopted the same restrictive practices that fail to
reveal essential information about former employees because these
employers will confirm only dates of employment or the title of
position.302 Therefore, all employers have a common business interest to
hire the best employees, and all employers have safety interests in
avoiding a job applicant who may be a dangerous or violent. 3 As a
result of this common interest, employers should be more open when
communicating to other employers particularly when they have
information regarding an employee's dangerous propensities. °4
B.

The Real Problem Lies not with Defamation Claims but with "No
Comment" Polices and Neutral Job Reference Schemes

Ironically, the employers' solution against defamation litigation,
namely the adoption of "no comment" and neutral job reference policies,
created other workplace problems leaving socially undesirable effects for
both employers and employees. 305 In a recent law article, Professor
Bradley Saxton3°6 observed that nationwide acceptance of "no comment"
policies is damaging to employees attempting to find employment when
their former employer refuses to give a reference to a prospective
employer.3°7 Some employers may interpret this "no comment"
response to a reference request as an implied negative response.308 Thus,
employers may unfairly hold prejudices against a job applicant whose

300
McMorris, supra note 8, at B1 (quoting a San Francisco attorney, "In the ideal world, you

want to be giving out more information [about employees] because, when you're hiring,
you want to find out about someone who may be problematic").
30, See id.
3M See id.
3w See id.

See id.
See infra notes 307-40 and accompanying text.
Bradley Saxton is an Associate Professor of Law at the University of Wyoming College
of Law.
3v See Bradley Saxton, Employment References in California After Randi W. v. Muroc Joint
Unified School District:A ProposalFor Legislation to Promote Responsible Employment Reference
Practices, 18 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 240, 266 (1997) [hereinafter Saxton, Employment
References].
3w Saxton, Flaws in the Laws, supra note 9, at 50.
3N
3
m
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former employer refuses to give a character reference, and consequently,
39
prospective employers may choose not to hire these applicants. 0
Professor Saxton also maintained that "no comment" policies injure
employers, because they discover that they need full and complete
references in order to make well-informed hiring decisions. 310 Detailed
references enable prospective employers to hire the most qualified
persons by learning about the applicant's strengths and weaknesses or
finding whether that individual could safely work with other employees
and the public-at-large. 311 Moreover, one unfortunate effect of "no
comment" policies relates to workplace violence. 312 Therefore, the next
part examines the nation's concern over workplace violence and the fact
that "no comment" policies may frustrate solutions to this growing
epidemic.
C.

Workplace Violence on the Rise: Prospective Employers Need More
Information RegardingJob Applicants

The Bureau of Labor Statistics has estimated that homicide accounts
for seventeen percent of all occupational fatalities, making homicide the
second leading cause of job-related deaths nationwide. 313 Presently,
more than 1,000 employees are murdered in workplaces each year,
which is thirty-two percent more homicides than the annual average in
the 1980s. 314 Homicide is the leading cause of death for women in the
workplace, and the second leading cause of death for men.315
Additionally, statistics estimate that more than two million physical
assaults occur annually in workplaces. 316 According to Northwestern

309See id.

310See id. at 49.
311See id.
312See id. at 50.

CC & Associates Private Investigators, Workplace Violence (visited Feb. 13, 1998)
<http://www/cc-investigations.com/wrkviol.htm>.
314Romuald A. Stone & Ronda Hayes, Developing Policies Addressing Workplace Violence,
EMPLOYMENT REL. TODAY, Sept. 1, 1995, at 25.
313

CC & Associates Private Investigators, supra note 313 (stating that United States
Department of Labor, Bureau of Statistics has advised that homicide accounts for 17% of all
occupational fatalities, making homicide the second leading cause of job-related deaths
nationwide); Stone & Hayes, supra note 314, at 25 (reporting that husbands and boyfriends
of working women commit 13,000 acts of violence against women in the workplace
annually).
316
McCormick & Stewart, supranote 25, at 34.
3Ss
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National Life Insurance Company, 2,500 for every 100,000 employees
31 7
have been physically attacked on the job.
These statistics show that workplace violence should not be taken
lightly by employers. As a result of this growing problem, the state and
federal courts have made employers responsible for preventing
workplace violence. 318 Specifically, courts have recognized a new cause
of action for employers, known as negligent hiring, which places an
obligation on employers to learn about an applicant's criminal and
violent behavior before and after hiring takes place. 319 Under a negligent
hiring theory, courts will hold a new employer liable for a person's
injuries committed by an employee whom the employer hired without
conducting a background check. 320 Further, courts may hold employers
liable for negligent hiring if it breaches this duty and hires a person that
the employer knew or should have known would pose a risk of harm to

Larry
J. Chavez,
Workplace
Violence
(visited
Feb.
13,
1998)
<http://members.aol.com/Endwpv/index.html#1>. The following pie chart breaks down

317

the percentages of people who commit attacks in the workplace, based on the statistic that
2,500 workers per 100,000 have been physically attacked on the job:
The Percentage of People who Commit
Workplace Atacks
former
bosses employees
co orkers
,
20%

tor

customers
clients
46%

strangers
24%

Id.
31

8 Martucci & Clemow, supra note 84, at 463; See also Sam Friedman, Allstate Faces Suit Over
Fireman'sFund Shooting, NAI'L UNDERwRITER PROP. & CASUALTY-RISK & BENEFITS MGMT.,
Sept. 26, 1994, at 3 available in 1994 WL 2867564.
319SMOLLA, supra note 65, at § 15.07[2][b] (asserting that the tort system adopted a new
theory of liability for employers called "negligent hiring," and under this new tort, third
parties and employees bring this cause of action when the employer fails to properly
investigate a new employee); see also Michele R. Gagnon, Employee Liability for Workplace
Violence (visited Feb. 13, 1998) <http://www.nvc.org/idir/nettex33.htm>. A claim for
negligent hiring requires the plaintiff to show that the employer knew or should have
known of the offending employee's criminal and violent behavior, but decided to hire or
retain the dangerous employee anyway. Id.
M SMOLLA, supra note 65, at § 15.07[2][b].
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other employees or to the public.321 Approximately thirty states
recognize that employers have a duty to hire and retain only safe
322
employees.
However, with "no comment" and neutral job reference policies
widely adopted by many companies, prospective employers will not be
able to obtain the necessary information regarding an applicant; thus
employers hire dangerous individuals. 323 In fact, a 1995 Human
Resource Management Survey revealed that more than half of the 1,331
personnel managers surveyed stated that they were not obtaining
enough information from former employers about applicants who show
violent tendencies. 324 The reason is that companies refuse to provide
references out of fear of defamation lawsuits. 325
Doe v. Garcia326 illustrates the seriousness of this social and legal
problem. In Garcia, a hospital employee molested a minor patient, and
as a result, the patient brought a negligent hiring claim against the
hospital.327 The evidence showed that the employee's former employer
did not have to reveal that it discharged the employee because he
sexually molested a patient.328 In particular, the former employer had a
neutral job reference policy in which it would disclose only the dates of
employment when asked to give a reference. 329 Thus, because of the
former employer's neutral job reference policy, the new employer had no
means to learn about the applicant's sexual proclivities and hired the
applicant.330 Nevertheless, the Idaho supreme court precluded the new
employer's motion for summary judgment on the negligent hiring
claim.331

Michele R. Gagnon, Employee Liability for Workplace Violence (visited Feb. 13, 1998)
<http://www.nvc.org/idir/nettex33.htn>.
322
Martucci & Clemow, supra note 84, at 463.
323With the widespread adoption of negligent hiring, employers must exercise reasonable
care upon hiring workers who will work safely with co-employees and with the public.
"No comment" policies preclude prospective employers from investigating a job
candidate's background, and as a result, the underlying principles behind negligent hiring
of social safety will become frustrated. Saxton, Flaws in the Laws, supranote 9, at 51.
324David A. Price, Good References Pave Road to Court, USA TODAY, Feb. 13,1997, at I1A.
321

3See

id.

M961 P.2d 1181 (Idaho 1998).

= Id.at 1182.
m Id. at 1183, 1185.
3" Id. at 1185.
" Id.

331Garcia,961

P.2d at 1185.
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To summarize, with the increase in workplace violence and
negligent hiring liability, 332 prospective employers should be able to
obtain complete and accurate references of an applicant without placing
333
However, under
the former employers at risk for defamation liability.
to
obtain character
the current law, prospective employers are not able
references regarding an applicant's violent behavior or dangerous
propensities, because former employers have no duty to disclose
Note that in
negative information about a former employee. 334
California, employers do have a duty to disclose this information if they
give a purely favorable reference while omitting the fact the employee
has shown violent behavior and its foreseeable that the employee will
injure a third party.335 With no legal duty to disclose information,
employers say very little about former employees in fear that they will
Additionally, prospective
be subject to defamation lawsuits.-Im
employers may become frustrated to learn that many states restrict

3 See supra notes 313-31 and accompanying text.
-3 See Adler & Peirce, Encourage Employers, supra note 179, at 1428. This article asserts that
with the increasing national concern about workplace violence, prospective employers
should have access to information which could avoid injury and save lives. Id. Employers
have difficulty when searching criminal records through other means because the process
is time consuming and expensive. Id. See also Saxton, Employment References, supra note
307, at 266. Professor Saxton contends, "[The public is poorly served if former employers
hide behind "no comment" reference policies to avoid disclosing information that would
alert a prospective new employer that a job applicant is dangerous or even merely
incompetent or unpleasant." Id. See also Christine A. Mansfield, When References Come Back
1998)
13,
Feb.
(visited
You
Haunt
to
With the increase in
<http://www.arentfox.com./newslett/employ/emp962d.htm>.
workplace violence, prospective employers interest in checking an applicant's history is
increasingly necessary. Id. A reference check could protect prospective employers from
lawsuits for negligent hiring. Id. See also Furfaro & Josephson, Workplace Violence II, supra
note 11, at 3 (stating that the employer wants accurate job references so that it may make
appropriate hiring decisions and prevent workplace violence in the future). For more
discussion on workplace violence see McCormick & Stewart, supra note 25, at 34 and see
Martucci & Clemow, supra note 84, at 463.
4 See Adler & Peirce, Encourage Employers, supra note 179, at 1417 (stating that to date,
courts have not established a blanket duty on the former employer to disclose information
about a former employee to prospective employers); see also Alex B. Long, Note, Addressing
the Cloud over Employee References: A Survey of Recently Enacted State Legislation, 39 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 177, 184 (1997) (stating that an employer has no affirmative duty to provide
employee references for prospective employers).
m Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified Sch. Dist., 929 P.2d 582, 591 (Cal. 1997) (holding that a
former employer was liable for negligent misrepresentation when it gave a favorable
reference to a prospective employer and failed to disclose former employee's past sexual
misconduct with students).
-36 See supra notes 279-84 and accompanying text. See generally Janet Swerdlow, Negligent
Referral:A PotentialTheoryfor Employer Liability, 64 S. CAL L. REv. 1645-70 (1991).
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information about criminal convictions. 337 When making a hiring
decision, prospective employers may not easily obtain essential
information through the criminal justice system.338 Their only source of
information regarding a job applicant will be the former employer who
may say very little about a prior employee's character. 339 Thus, with
such a restrictive information flow, prospective employers may
unknowingly hire a violent individual, place its employees and the
public at risk for their safety, and place themselves at risk for negligent
hiring liability. 340
IV. AN ANALYSIS OF STATE COURT DECISIONS ON REFERENCE LIABILITY
This material explained the socially undesirable effects of "no
comment" and neutral policies. In particular, these restrictive policies
lead to workplace injuries and assaults as well as negligent hiring
liability, because prospective employers are unable to gather the critical
employment backgrounds on job applicants. Thus, employers may
unknowingly hire dangerous individuals who later attack their
employees or the public. In the following case law, although the former
employers did not have "no comment" policies, some of these employers
had neutral job reference policies that resulted in the deaths of workers
at a prospective employer's workplace. 341
Further, other former
employers provided favorable references but failed to disclose negative
information regarding previous employees such as the employees past
sexual misconduct or violent tendencies that resulted in violent crimes
toward students or co-workers. 342 This discussion asserts that the harm
to third parties that results from a full non-disclosure in "no comment"
policies can be compared to the harm that third parties face when former
employers give references but fail to reveal information about their

w ROTHSITIN & LIEBMAN, supra note 265,, at 146 (expressing that many states restrict
information about criminal convictions, thus this information is not easily available to
prospective employers).
3n See id.
3" See id.
34 See, e.g., Doe v. Garcia, 961 P.2d 1181 (Idaho 1998). The former employer's reluctance

places a heavy social cost for other employers who seek to make well-informed hiring
decisions. SMOLLA, supra note 65 at § 15.07[21[b]. See also Saxton, Employment References,
supra note 307, at 266 (stating that Randi W. is an example of how the public is adversely
effected when employers try to avoid liability by using "no comment" policies).
31 See generally Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified Sch. Dist., 929 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1997); Jerner
v. Allstate Ins. Co., Fla. Cir. Ct. No. 93-09472 (1993); Gutzan v. Altair Airlines Inc., 766 F.2d
135 (3d Cir. 1985); Moore v. St. Joseph Nursing Home, Inc., 459 N.W.2d 100 (Mich. Ct. App.
1990); and Cohen v. Wales, 133 A.D.2d 94 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986).
3Q Id.
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previous employees. Moreover, undesirable effects and dangers found
in "no comment" and neutral reference practices are equivalent to those
hazards found in favorable references that omit material information3 43
A.

States Holding that Former Employers Have a Duty to Disclose
Information in a Favorableor Neutral Reference Regarding an Employee's
Propensityfor Violence

A complex issue is whether a former employer's silence that takes
the form of a "no comment" policy could constitute an action of deceit or
misrepresentation when a former employer has knowledge of particular
facts about a former employee? 44 This Note stated previously that
currently courts have refused to impose a blanket duty on the part of
former employers to disclose negative information about a former
employee to prospective employers.3w However, employers should not
relax on this issue because some state courts like California and Florida
have begun to expand a former employer's duty of reasonable care to
unknown third parties with regard to employment references. 346 More
specifically, when giving a favorable or neutral reference, an employer
may be held liable to third parties if the employer failed to disclose
information about a former employee's violent behavior in the
workplace.347 This type of liability has been found under negligent
misrepresentation and intentional misrepresentation theories in Randi W.
v. Muroc Joint Unified School Districts48 and Gutzan v. Altair Airlines, Inc.,349
as well as argued in Jerner v. Allstate InsuranceCo.3se
In the future, other state courts may expand on these principles set
forth in the Randi W. decision. Courts may determine that former
employers may be held liable for misrepresentation when they not only
give favorable references, but also when they say "no comment" or
submit neutral job references that fail to reveal a former employee's

3

0 See, e.g., Doe v. Garcia, 961 P.2d 1181 (Idaho 1998); Jerner v. Allstate Ins., Fla. Cir. Ct. No.
93-09472 (1993).
344
KEETON ET AL, supra note 6, at 737 (expressing the difficult problem as to whether silence

or a passive failure to disclose facts that the defendant has knowledge of could be a basis
for a deceit action).
345
See supra notes 230-34 and accompanying text.
34 See, e.g., Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified Sch. Dist., 929 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1997); Jemer v.
Allstate Ins., Fla. Cir. Ct. No. 93-09472 (1993).
347
Randi W., 929 P.2d at 593; Jerner v. Allstate Ins., Fla. Cir. Ct. No. 93-09472 (1993).
4a929 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1997).
349
766 F.2d 135 (3d Cir.1985).
m0 Fla. Cir. Ct. No. 93-09472 (1993).
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dangerous behavior in the workplace. 351 Presently, a Florida court ruled
on the issue of non-disclosure and a neutral reference supplied by a
former employer. 352 In Jerner v. Allstate Insurance Co.,3w the Florida court
determined that a jury would decide whether a former employer's
neutral reference constituted fraud and negligent misrepresentation. 354
Thus, saying very little about an employee when asked to give a
reference may save an employer from defamation litigation, but silence
may expose the employer to misrepresentation or negligence liability in
the future. These are more compelling reasons as to why employers
should re-examine their "no comment" and neutral job reference policies
and adopt reference practices that open the channel of communications
among employers. A closer study of the state opinions of Randi W. v.
Muroc Joint Unified School District,355 Jerner v. Allstate Insurance,356 and
Gutzan v. Altair Airlines, Inc. 7 solidifies the reasons why employers
should openly communicate with one another.
1. Randi v.Muroc Joint Unified School District
The state of California has chosen to hold former employers liable
when giving a favorable reference that omits negative information
regarding a former employee's past sexual misconduct to prospective
employers under the theories of negligent misrepresentation 3- 8 and
3s'Reibstein, supra note 18, at B5 (predicting that future plaintiffs may seek to expand the

Randi W. decision to include neutral job references and references that do not include an
express recommendation to hire. Thus, the Randi W. decision suggests that employers
should re-examine their employment reference policies); See part IV.D. for an explanation
of the future effects of the Randi W. decision.
Jerner v. Allstate Ins., Fla. Cir. Ct. No. 93-09472 (1993).
3w Id.
354
See Adler & Peirce, EncourageEmployers, supra note 179, at 1418. In Allstate, the plaintiffs
supported their argument for fraud and negligent misrepresentation by comparing
Allstate's neutral reference letter addressed to a prospective employer with an Allstate
supervisor who stated in a deposition that the former employee was a "total lunatic." Id.
- 929 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1997).
36 Fla. Cir. Ct. No. 93-09472 (1993).
357 766 F.2d 135 (3d Cir. 1985).
3 See supra part ll.C.1. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 311 (1965). Section 311
deals with negligent conduct and provides that.
(1) One who negligently gives false information to another is subject to
liability for physical harm caused by action taken by the other in
reasonable reliance upon such information, where such harm results
(a) to the other, or
(b) to such third persons as the actor should expect to be put in peril
by the action taken.
(2) Such negligence may consist of failure to exercise reasonable care
(a) in ascertaining the accuracy of the information, or
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intentional misrepresentation. 359 In Randi v. Muroc Joint Unified School
District,36 ° a former employer, Muroc Joint Unified School District
(Muroc), failed to disclose to a prospective employer, Livingston Middle
School (Livingston), that its former employee had been forced to resign
because of sexual misconduct towards female' students.36 1 Muroc gave
only a positive job reference stating that Robert Gadams, the former
employee, was "an upbeat, enthusiastic administrator who relate[d] well
[with] the students." 362
Livingston relied on this favorable
recommendation and hired Robert as a vice-principal.6 While in his
office, Robert "offensively touched and molested" a 13 year-old female
student.3"
The minor student, Randi W., filed a lawsuit against Muroc,3
claiming negligent misrepresentation and intentional misrepresentation,
(b) in the manner in which it is communicated.
Id.
3"

See supra part II.C.2. See also RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 310 (1965). Section 310
involves intentional conduct or fraud and provides that:
An actor who makes a misrepresentation is subject to liability to
another for physical harm which results from an act done by the other
or a third person in reliance upon the truth of the representation, if the
actor
(c) intends his statement to induce or should realize that it is likely to
induce action by the other, or a third person, which involves an
unreasonable risk of physical harm to the other, and
(d) knows
(i) that the statement is false, or
(ii)that he has not the knowledge which he professes.
Id.; Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified Sch. Dist., 929 P.2d 582, 591, 593 (Cal. 1997).
*0Randi W., 929 P.2d at 582.
361 Id. at 585. Among other things, Robert was charged with sexually touching female
students at Muroc, and disciplinary actions were taken against Robert regarding sexual
harassment. Id. Additionally, at a previous school, Mendota Unified School District,
Robert had been charged with giving back massages to female students and making sexual
remarks to them. Id. At another school, Golden Plains Unified School District, parents of
the students complained that Robert "led a panty raid [and] made sexual overtures to the
students...." Id. Both of these schools, Mendota and Golden Plains, forced Robert to resign
because of his sexual misbehavior, yet both schools gave positive recommendations for Mr.
Adams to pursue an administrative position at Muroc, and eventually at Livingston. Id.
w6 Id. Muroc Joint Unified School District, the former employer, made positive
recommendations on forms that Fresno Pacific College had supplied. Id. These
recommendation forms expressly stated that the information provided would be sent to
prospective employers. Id.
30 Id. at 588.
36Id. at 585.
wMRandi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified Sch. Dist., 929 P.2d 582,584 (Cal. 1997). Specifically, the
student, Randi W., filed this lawsuit through her guardian ad litem against Livinsgton
Unified School District for negligent hiring, and Muroc Joint Unified School District,
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and filed another action against Livingston for negligent hiring. 3 6 In
deciding this case, the Randi W. court had to determine whether to
expand the theories of negligent misrepresentation and intentional
misrepresentation to these circumstances in which the former employer
had no special relationship with student, a third party.367 The student
had to provide sufficient evidence demonstrating that Muroc, the former
employer, owed her a duty of care, and that it breached that duty by
making misrepresentations or giving false information. 36
a)

The Former Employer's Duty to the Injured Third Party

Muroc, the former employer, argued that it owed no duty to the
student because no special relationship existed between them.369
Further, Muroc argued that the student was not a "readily identifiable"
victim, and thus it had no duty to warn the student about the charges
against Robert Gadams. 370 However, the Randi W. court applied a fourpart "duty" test to determine whether the tort of negligent
misrepresentation should be expanded whereby a former employer
owed a duty to use reasonable care to unknown third parties upon
giving an incomplete recommendation. 37' Specifically, the court looked
to the forseeability of harm to the student, the moral blame attached to
Muroc's conduct, the availability of insurance or alternative courses of
conduct that Muroc could have taken, and public policy
considerations. 372

Golden Plains Unified School District, Mendota Unified School District, the State of
California, et al. for negligence per se, negligent misrepresentation, and intentional
misrepresentation. Id.
3
See supra part lH.C. for a discussion regarding negligent hiring liability imposed on
prospective employers.
Randi W., 929 P.2d 582, 587,590.
Id. at 588.
Id.; see supra note 234 and accompanying text.
m0 Randi W., 929 P.2d at 588. However, the student did not contend that a special
relationship existed between her and Muroc or between Muroc and Robert. Id.
37
Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified Sch. Dist., 929 P.2d 582,588-91 (Cal. 1997).
372
Id. See also Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 564 (Cal. 1968). The Randi W. court relied
on the balancing test set forth in Rowland for determining duty which includes the
following7
[tihe foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that
the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between
the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame
attached to the defendant's conduct, the policy of preventing future
harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to
the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting
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Under the first prong of the duty test, forseeability and causation,
the Randi W. court found that Robert's assault on the plaintiff was a
reasonably foreseeable event. 3 3 The court determined that Muroc could
foresee that Livingston would rely on the positive recommendation from
Muroc in deciding whether to hire Robert; and absent this favorable
referral, Livingston would not have hired him. 374 Muroc could also
foresee that after being hired by Livingston, Robert might molest a
Livingston student such as the plaintiff. 375 Therefore, Muroc's omission

and misrepresentations of not stating Robert's past sexual misconduct in
the recommendation letter directly and proximately caused plaintiff's
376
injuries.
Under the second prong of the duty test, moral blame, the Randi W.
court decided that Muroc was morally blameworthy. 377

Muroc's

favorable recommendation coupled with the failure to communicate
facts about Robert's past sexual misconduct failed to prevent a further
risk of child molestation. 378 Additionally, under the third prong, the
availability of insurance or alternative courses of conduct, the court
found that Muroc could have acquired business liability insurance for
any negligent misrepresentations. 3" In addition, for alternative courses
of conduct other than the affirmative misrepresentation, the court
determined that Muroc could have written a "full disclosure" letter
revealing both good and bad information regarding Robert's character
and performance.8
On the other side of the spectrum, the Randi W.
court found that Muroc could have also chosen to produce a "no
comment" letter that would prohibit any affirmative misrepresentations
regarding Robert's character. 38' Finally, under the fourth prong of the
duty test, the public policy considerations, the court recognized the
public policy in preventing a future harm like child molestation if the
court expanded the tort duty of care to former employers. 382 Under this
liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of
insurance for the risk involved.
Id.
37

Randi W., 929 P.2d at 589.

4 Id.
6
3 Id.
376 ld.

377
3M

Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified Sch. Dist., 929 P.2d 582,589 (Cal. 1997).
Id.

3Nid.
3W

Id.

3811Id.

m Id. The Randi W. court states, "[o]ne of society's highest priorities is to protect children
from sexual or physical abuse. Id.
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four-part test, the Randi W. court concluded that it would indeed expand
the former employer's duty of care to convey information that would
prevent substantial and foreseeable risk of harm to others but only when
the former employer gives a favorable referral.m3
b) The Former Employer's
Prospective Employer

Misrepresentations

to

the

Next, the Randi W. court looked to whether Muroc made a
misleading misrepresentation or a mere nondisclosure. 8 4 The Randi W.
court determined that Muroc, the former employer, made an affirmative
misrepresentation, because the school implied that Robert was fit to
interact safely with female students when it stated in its letter that he
was an "upbeat, enthusiastic administrator who relates well to the
students."3 5 Thus, this letter amounted to a favorable yet an unqualified
recommendation of Robert's character. 6 Additionally, the court
concluded that Muroc made misleading "half-truths" by stating only the
positive characteristics of Robert, while concealing Robert's "sexual
situations" with prior female students.W
c)

The Prospective Employer's Reliance on the Former
Employer's Statements

The court found that the law of intentional misrepresentation did
not bar the student from recovering under this doctrine even though
Muroc made no misrepresentations directly to the student that the

Id. at 590-91. Muroc, however, argued that imposing tort duty of care on former
employers who choose to write recommendation letters would foster "no comment"
policies which restrict the flow of information that prospective employers need to make
sound well-informed hiring decisions. Id. Conversely, the plaintiffs argued that employers
would be protected from defamation liability through the use of qualified privilege statutes
for non-malicious communications. Id. Muroc did not respond to the plaintiffs qualified
privilege argument; however, amicus curiae briefs argued that the privilege protects
employers from defamation as well as other torts such as negligent misrepresentation. Id.
However, the Randi W. court interpreted the qualified privilege statute as being intended to
provide employers with a defense by former employee only, rather than to protect
employers from all tort liability arising from employment disclosures that third parties
could bring against them. Id. The court determined that Muroc was not protected under
the qualified privilege since under the statute, prospective employers must request a
reference from former employers whereas Muroc, the former employer, solicited the
information without such a request from Livingston, the prospective employer. Id.
3 4
Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified Sch. Dist., 929 P.2d 582,591 (Cal. 1997).
3m'

30 Id. at 593.
m6 Id.
3vId.

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol33/iss2/7

Oliver: Opening the Channels of Communication Among Employers: Can Employ

OPENING THE CHANNELS

1999]

743

student would reasonably rely on.3 9 The court reasoned that the authors
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 310 on intentional
misrepresentation intended for courts to apply this doctrine to cases in
which third parties are endangered by the misrepresentation.?
Therefore, the Randi W. court found that Muroc made misrepresentations
that resulted in physical harm by reason of an act done by Livingston,
namely hiring Robert, in reliance on the truth of the representations. 39°
d) A Response to the Decision of Randi v. Muroc Joint Unified
School District
The Randi W. court provided a solution to a former employer's
potential liability of misrepresentation when giving a job reference. 391
The solution was simply to refrain from giving such a reference
altogether and issue a "no comment" letter.392 However, these restrictive
policies contain serious social and economic consequences for third
parties and prospective employers. By advocating these practices, the
Randi W. ruling only exacerbates the problems of "no comment" and
neutral job reference policies, such as increasing the likelihood of
workplace violence and negligent hiring liability. 393 This decision
further frustrates the prospective employer's efforts in attempting to
obtain an applicant's employment history used to hire the best person
for the job.3 4 Whether Muroc gave an affirmative misrepresentation that
failed to uncover Robert's past sexual relations with young girls, or
whether Muroc submitted a "no comment" letter that revealed nothing
about Robert's past sexual misconduct, Livingston would not have
obtained any facts regarding Robert's propensities to commit gruesome
acts toward young students. 39 As discussed, "no comment" and neutral

39 Id. at 594.
3" Id. at 593. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 310 cmt.c (1965) which provides,

"A misrepresentation may be [made] not only toward a person whose conduct it is
intended to influence but also toward all others whom the maker should recognize as likely
to be imperiled by action taken in reliance upon his misrepresentation." Id.
3W Id.
391Id. at 589 (stating that a former employer could write a "no comment" letter omitting

any affirmative representations regarding a former employee's qualifications, or merely
verifying basic employment dates and details).
m Id.

m See supra part IHL.B. and part m.C.; See infra notes 485-89 and accompanying text.
4 Saxton, Employment References, supranote at 307, at 266.
m"See id. at 266. Randi W. is an example of how public policy is adversely affected when
employers try to avoid liability by hiding behind "no comment" policies. Id. "When our
legal rules encourage employers to use 'no comment' reference polices to avoid liabilityas the [Randi W.] court acknowledged they could-prospective employers may be unable
3
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job reference policies work to restrict open communication between
employers. 396 Therefore, these polices could be equally dangerous as an
affirmative misrepresentation because prospective employers cannot
obtain essential information about job applicants. 397 As a result, third
parties, who become injured at the hands of violent employees, could
bring lawsuits based on a negligent hiring theory against prospective
employers. 398
In a nutshell, Randi W. is a prime example of how a former
employer's duty of care could be expanded to an unknown third party
even though no special relationship exists between the former employer
and the third party. 399 The Randi W. court carved out an exception to the
general "no duty" rule that precludes liability for a mere non-disclosure
or other failure to act unless a "special relationship" exists between the
parties." ° At least in California, the former employer's duty arises once
the employer chooses to speak favorably about the employee. 401 Thus,
employers who give positive references out of fear for defamation
liability should take note that a positive reference may lead to intentional
and negligent misrepresentation liability.
On the other hand, Randi W. implies that if a former employer
conveys nothing or gives neutral information, then the employer has no
duty to disclose any negative information even if disclosure could
prevent a future harm. 4 2 However, courts should find that the interest
in protecting the safety of society outweighs the interest of employees
from being defamed. 40 3 Naturally, a public interest exists to prevent
potential danger to employees and to the public-at-large. 4 4
Unfortunately, the Randi W. decision just reinforces the'idea that
employers are right to keep their "no comment" policies and remain
silent when faced with a reference request. 4°s Thus, absent a common

to obtain information that, if available, would discourage them from hiring employees with
demonstrated propensities to hurt or abuse others, including children." Id.
396See supra part nl.C.
397See id.
3 See id.

9
M
See generally Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified Sch. Dist., 929 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1997).
4w Id. at 593.
401Saxton, Employment References, supra note 307, at 265.
4 See id.
4w See Janet Swerdlow, Negligent Referral: A Potential Theory for Employer Liability, 64 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1645, 1668 (1991).
44 Id. at 1670.
" See infra notes 485-91 and accompanying text. Saxton, Employment References, supra note
at 307, at 265 (expressing that the Randi W. decision gives a message to employers that they
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law duty to disclose, a statutory duty to disclose a former employee's
dangerous tendencies should be imposed on employers provided that
they are protected under qualified privilege statutes for disclosing both
positive and negative information. °6
The case of Jernerv. Allstate Insurance Company4°' presents a situation
that goes one step further than the Randi W. decision, because Allstate
involves a neutral job reference rather than a favorable recommendation.
Similar to the plaintiff in the Randi W. case, the plaintiffs in Allstate
brought both negligent and intentional misrepresentation claims against
an employer who recommended a former employee to another employer
without mentioning the employee's dangerous proclivities. A closer
investigation of the Allstate case reveals that employers may want to
observe the defenses to defamation 4° 8 and reveal more information about
a former employee's history even when giving a neutral job reference.
2. Jerner v. Allstate Insurance Company
Although the Florida case of Jerner v. Allstate Insurance Company4 9
settled out of court, this case represents another illustration of how
former employer's liability could be extended when the former employer
gives a recommendation and fails to disclose a former employee's
dangerous propensities. 410 Allstate Insurance, a former employer, sent a
neutral but incomplete referral letter, which merely stated that Allstate
released Paul Calden from his employment for restructuring reasons. 411
Allstate's referral failed to warn the prospective employer, Fireman's
Fund Insurance Co., that Mr. Calden had been fired for bringing a gun to
work and for threatening his co-workers. 412 Based on the neutral

may completely avoid liability including defamation, negligent misrepresentation, and
intentional misrepresentation if they refuse to give references because they have no duty to
disclose any information).
4
m See infra part V for proposed statute.
4
wFla. Cir. Ct. No. 93-09472 (1993).
4m See supra notes 127-221 and accompanying text.
409 Jerner v. Allstate Ins., Co., Fla. Cir. Ct. No. 93-09472 (1993).
410Asra Q. Nomani, A Special News Report About L!fe On the Job and Trends Taking Shape
There, WALL ST. J., Aug. 15, 1995, at Al.
411Vickie Chachere, Suit Settled in Rocky Point Shootings: The Gunman's Former Employer
Readies a Pact with the Victims and Families, TAMPA TRIB., Oct. 3, 1995, at 1, available in 1995
WL 14264532.
42 Larry J. Chavez, What Organizationsand Individuals Have Done to Invite Workplace Violence
(visited Feb. 13,1998) <http://members.aol.com/endwpv/invite.html>. See also Friedman,
supra note 313, at 3 (stating that John Deufel who had been Paul Calden's supervisor at
Allstate, stated that he had found Mr. Calden with a gun in his briefcase three years before
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recommendation, Fireman's Fund hired Mr. Calden. 413
However,
Fireman's Fund eventually fired him after several incidents of
threatening his co-employees. 414 Shortly thereafter, a group of managers
from the nearby Fireman's Fund were having lunch when Mr. Calden
approached them and fired ten shots from a semi-automatic handgun,
killing three, and wounding two of his former co-workers. 415 The two
surviving victims along with the widows of the three managers who
were killed brought a lawsuit claiming negligence and intentional
416
misrepresentation against the former employer, Allstate Insurance.
The issue in Allstate was whether Allstate had a duty to warn the new
employer, Fireman's Fund, that the former employee had been fired
from Allstate for violent behavior and for bringing a gun to work.417 The
plaintiffs claimed that Allstate did have a duty of reasonable care to the
Fireman's Fund's employees, and argued that Allstate's neutral
reference, which failed to warn Fireman's Fund of the former employee's
418
violent behavior, constituted a breach of this duty.
A Florida Judge419 ruled that Allstate, Mr. Calden's former
employer, could be sued by the surviving victims and families of the
murdered managers for giving Mr. Calden a neutral recommendation
that failed to disclose Mr. Calden's propensity for dangerous activity and
violent tendencies. 420 The Judge further ruled that the families of the
employees who had been killed could claim punitive damages against
Allstate. 42 Although the case had been set for trial, the parties settled
out of court for an undisclosed amount of money.422

the Fireman's Fund Shooting. The lawsuit claimed that Allstate representatives "learned
that Calden was mentally troubled.. .and had a dangerous propensity for violence").
413
Chachere, supra note 411, at 1; Alder & Peirce, EncouragingEmployers, supra note 179, at
1418.
4
41
Chavez, supra note 412, at 4 (stating before Mr. Calden parted with Fireman's Fund, he
threatened his fellow employees by stating, "You haven't heard the last of me").
415 Id. at 3 (reporting that after the gruesome shooting, witnesses heard Mr. Calden say
"That's what you get for firing me." Two hours later, Mr. Calden shot himself).
416 Alder & Peirce, EncouragingEmployers, supra note 179, at 1418.
7
41
References Unavailable,Bus. INS., Aug. 21, 1995, at 8.
418 Id. Chachere, supra note 411, at 1 (reporting that the plaintiffs claimed that Allstate knew
Paul Calden was dangerous when the company fired him, but the company gave him a
letter of recommendation anyway).
419
Asra Q. Nomani, A Special News Report About Life on the Job and Trends Taking Shape There,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 15, 1995, at Al (reporting that the presiding judge over Jerner v. Allstate
Ins., Co. was the honorable Robert Bonnano in Hillsborough County, Florida).
M Id.
42
1References Unavailable,supra note 417, at 8.
M Chachere, supranote 411, at 1.
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Arguably, the deaths of three Fireman's Fund managers and the
injuries of the two others could have been avoided had Allstate not given
Paul Calden a letter of recommendation that failed to inform the
prospective employer of his mental state and his propensity for
violence.423 One article recognized that there is an increase in workplace
violence and a growing trend to hold employers liable for the
consequences of the violence. 424 In Allstate, the injured parties chose to
hold the former employer liable for failing to inform a prospective
employer about an employee's dangerous behavior. 42 Thus, former
employers should beware of what they conceal even when giving
neutral references, because
they may be held liable for
misrepresentation. In addition to the Randi W., and Allstate cases, the
federal case of Gutzan v. Altair Airlines, Inc.426 poses a similar risk of
negligent liability for employers who choose to give incomplete
references to prospective employers.
3.

Gutzan v. Altair Airlines, Inc.

In Gutzan v. Altair Airlines, Inc.,427 an employment agency
interviewed an applicant for a position with a prospective employer,
Altair Airlines.428 While interviewing with the agency, the applicant
disclosed that he was convicted of raping his ex-girlfriend while serving
in the military in a foreign country.429 However, he explained that he
really did not rape her but that the military incarcerated him merely to
"appease foreign women who made such charges." 43° No one at the
referral agency looked into the incident that led to the applicant's rape
conviction. 431 The applicant then told the same story to Altair Airlines,
the prospective employer. 432 Relying on the agency's referral, Altair
Airlines hired the candidate not knowing the true story behind the rape
434
conviction. 433 A year later, the new employee raped a co-employee.
Both the referral agency and Altair Airlines later learned that the

4" Friedman, supra note 318, at 3.
424 See id.
M3See id.
4m 766 F.2d 135 (3d Cir. 1985).
47 Id.

M2Id. at 137.
4n Id.

w Id.
431Id.

M Gutzan v. Altair Airlines, Inc., 766 F.2d 135,137 (3d Cir. 1985).
4m Id.

Id. at 138.
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offending employee fabricated his original story regarding the rape
charge and found that the candidate was convicted of assaulting and
raping a former co-worker who also worked in the military.
A jury found for the employee who was raped by her violent coworker based on the theory of negligence against the employment
agency who gave the referral. 436 The plaintiff also brought a negligent
hiring charge against Altair Airlines, the prospective employer, but the
company settled out of court.437 On appeal, the court affirmed the jury's
verdict and held that the referral agency was liable under the theory of
negligent misrepresentation. 438 The Gutzan court reasoned that the
agency had reason to believe that Altair Airlines had no knowledge of
the danger and risk of harm of the applicant's past employment with
female employees because of the agency's reassurances. 439 Therefore, a
reasonable jury could conclude that the agency did not alert Altair
Airlines to be on guard of the applicant's violent tendencies, but rather
permitted Altair Airlines to lower its guard and refrain from exercising
proper care for the safety of Altair Airlines' employees. 440 This decision
indicates that an agency owes a duty to third parties not to act
negligently when giving a referral and that the agency's acts and
omissions are important. 441 While this discussion provided examples of
why employers should re-evaluate their job reference policies, the next
section addresses jurisdictions that presently do not hold employers
accountable for concealing information about a former employee.
States that do not Hold Former Employers Liable for Failing to Disclose
Information in a Reference about an Employee's Propensityfor Violence

B.

Although a federal district court in Gutzan and the California
Supreme Court in Randi W. imposed a "duty" on employers who omit
negative information when giving a favorable reference under theories
of negligent misrepresentation and intentional misrepresentation, the
New York and Michigan legal systems refuse to expand these theories." 2

Id.
46 Id.
at 138.
4s

4'Id.
M

Gutzan v. Altair Airlines, Inc., 766 F.2d 135,141 (3d Cir. 1985). See supra part Il.C.1.

4" Gutzan, 766 F.2d 141.

4OId.
441 Id. at 139. The trial court judge stated, "Still another way of measuring negligent
behavior is to call negligent an act or omission that would be avoided by a reasonable man,
properly considerate of the safety of others..... Id.
442See supra part IV.C. for a comparison of case law.
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Particularly, under current New York and Michigan state laws,
employers in these jurisdictions are not required to disclose negative
information regarding a former employee's past sexual misconduct or
violent propensities even when providing a favorable reference. 443 A
detailed analysis of the New York case, Cohen v. Wales, 4"4 and the
Michigan case, Moore v. St. Joseph Nursing Home, Inc.,445 is necessary to
comprehend the differences in these opinions.
1.

Cohen v. Wales

Although the case of Cohen v. Wales" 6 had a similar fact pattern to
the Randi W. case, the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme
Court decided not to hold a former employer negligently liable for
giving a good recommendation about a teacher who previously sexually
assaulted a student.447 In Cohen, an employer recommended a former
employee for a position as an elementary school teacher to another
school without disclosing the fact that the teacher had been previously
charged with sexual misconduct."4 The prospective employer hired the
recommended teacher, and subsequently, the teacher assaulted a minor
student at the new school. 40 The Cohen court held that upon writing a
letter of recommendation, a former employer owed no duty to a third
party victim, the minor student, even though the former employer failed
to disclose that the teacher had been charged with sexual misconduct. 45°
Particularly, the court determined that a mere recommendation of a
person to a prospective employer was not a proper basis for a claim of
negligence where another party is responsible for the actual hiring.451
The court reasoned that under common law, a person has no duty to
warn third parties about potential danger unless a special relationship
42
exists between that person and the third party or a foreseeable victim. 5
Therefore, the court could not find a sound public policy to expand the

40 See infra notes 444-67 and accompanying text.

- 133 A.D.2d 94 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987).
40 459 N.W.2d 100 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990).
- Cohen, 133 A.D.2d 94.
" Id. at 95.
44 Id.
9 Id.
45

Cohen v. Wales, 133 A.D.2d 94,95 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987).

451Id.
4
MId.
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common law duty needed to hold the former employer negligently
4
liable. 5

2. Moore v. St. Joseph Nursing Home, Inc.
The Moore v. St. Joseph Nursing Home, Inc.454 case described in the
opening paragraph demonstrates that the State of Michigan does not
impose a duty on a former employer to disclose information in a
favorable reference regarding a former employee's dangerous and
violent propensities to a prospective employer.45 In Moore, St. Clair had
been employed with St. Joseph Nursing Home. 4- After St. Clair received
numerous disciplinary warnings for violent conduct as well as for the
use of drugs and alcohol on the job, St. Joseph terminated his
employment. 457 St. Clair then applied for another job with a new
employer and listed his former employer, St. Joseph Nursing Home, as a
reference.4 8 Although the new employer never contacted St. Joseph
Nursing Home, the latter confessed that if it had been asked to provide a
reference, it would have only given a neutral reference merely
confirming dates of employment. 45
Consequently, St. Clair savagely beat and murdered a security
guard at the new employer's workplace.460 The plaintiffs brought a
negligence action against St. Joseph claiming that the omission of
information regarding St. Clair's past violent behavior and drug use
constituted negligence. 461 The plaintiffs further argued that the former
employer had a duty to disclose his violent behavior to the new
employer under the Michigan's qualified privilege statute. 462
Specifically, the plaintiffs asserted that a special duty existed between the
former employer and the new employer which arose from a moral and
social duty implied in the qualified privilege statute.463

4s ld.

44 459 N.W.2d 100 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990).
40 Id. at

46Id. at

103.

101.

07Id. at 101, 102.
4

Id. at 102.

4"Id.
46
Moore v. St. Joseph Nursing Home, Inc., 459 N.W. 2d 100, 101 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990).
461Id. at 102.
4a Id.
w Id.
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However, the Moore court disagreed with the plaintiffs by holding
that under the Michigan qualified privilege statute, employers have no
legal obligation to disclose negative information about a former
employee. 4" The Michigan statute's conditional privilege merely allows
or permits employers to divulge information concerning a former
employee to a prospective employer, but employers are not legally
obligated to do so.4 5 The court also weighed the competing interest of
confidential employment records and a prospective employer's right to
know about an applicant and determined that the former interest was
paramount.46 6
The court concluded that the legislature was the
appropriate branch to regulate defamation law and declined to find a
former employer's duty under the existing Michigan qualified privilege
467
statute.
C.

A Comparison of Case Law

In order to fully understand the different outcomes between the
cases of Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified School District,4" Gutzan v. Altair
Airlines, Inc.,469 and the precedents of Moore v. St. Joseph Nursing Home,
472
Inc.,4" ° and Cohen v. Wales,471 a comparison of the case law is essential.
4
3
The courts in Cohen and Moore relied on the general principle 7 that a
person owes "no duty" of care to another unless a special relationship
exists between the two parties or when there is a foreseeable victim. 474 In
4H Id.

4m
Id. at 102, 103.
4
m Moore v. St. Joseph Nursing Home, Inc., 459 N.W. 2d 100, 102 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990).
Id. at 103.
- 929 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1997).
4 766 F.2d 135 (3d Cir. 1985).
47 459 N.W.2d 100 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990).
4- 133 A.D.2d 94 (N.Y. App. Div.1987).
472Note that although the facts in the New York case of Cohen were almost identical to
those in the California opinion of Randi W., surprisingly the two judgments were
inconsistent.
m See also supra Part H.C.1. See also RESTATOErr (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965) which
provides:
There is no duty to control the conduct of a third person as to prevent
him from causing physical harm to another unless
(a) a special relationship exists between the actor and the third
person which imposes a duty upon the actor to control the third

person's conduct, or
(b) a special relation exists between the actor and the other which
gives to the other a right to protection.
Id.
474
Compare Cohen v. Wales, 133 A.D.2d 94,95 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (holding that a former
employer owes no duty to a third party or prospective employer when giving a favorable
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contrast, the court in Randi W. and Gutzan carved out an exception to the
"no duty" rule by expanding the tort liability to former employers who
made misrepresentations that placed a substantial foreseeable risk of
physical injury to third persons. 475 Specifically, the Randi W. and Gutzan
courts referred to the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 311 negligent
misrepresentation in their analysis; however neither the Cohen court nor
the Moore court recognized this doctrine in their opinions. 476 The Randi
W. forum also considered moral blameworthiness, foreseeability of
harm, and public policy arguments when expanding the duty of care
whereas the Cohen court did not observe these factors. 477 In particular,
the Cohen court did not recognize an important public policy
consideration to protect children from sexual or physical abuse, which
478
was dissimilar to Randi W. court's analysis.
In addition, similar to the court's reasoning in Randi W. but unlike
the Cohen judicial analysis, the Moore court keenly observed moral and
social duties on the part of former employers to release information
regarding an employee's violent behavior.479 Unfortunately, the Moore
court still decided not to carve out an exception to the general "no duty"
rule by concluding that employers have no legal duty to disclose
negative information about a former employee to prospective employers,
4°
which was similar to the Cohen court's conclusion. 8

reference that omits information regarding a former employee's past sexual misconduct
with students), with Moore v. St. Joseph Nursing Home, Inc., 459 N.W.2d 100, 103 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1990) (stating that it would be necessary to demonstrate a special relationship
between the parties to impose an actionable duty. In this case, there is no duty to warn
since no special relationship existed between the former employer and injured third party
and the third party was not a foreseeable victim).
45 Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified Sch. Dist., 929 P.2d 582, 591 (1997) (holding that a
former employer owes a duty of care to third parties when a favorable reference fails to
disclose a former employee's past sexual misconduct which amounts to
misrepresentations); Gutzan v. Altair Airlines, Inc., 766 F.2d 135 (3d Cir. 1985).
476 Randi W., 929 P.2d at 591, Gutzan, 766 F.2d at 140. See generally Moore v. St. Joseph
Nursing Home, Inc., 459 N.W.2d 100 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990); Cohen v. Wales, 133 A.D.2d 94
(N.Y. App. Div. 1997).
7 Randi W., 929 P.2d at 588-91. See generally Cohen v. Wales, 133 A.D.2d 94 (N.Y. App. Div.
1997).
4n Randi W., 929 P.2d at 589. See generally Cohen v. Wales, 133 A.D.2d 94 (N.Y. App. Div.
1997).
4 Moore v. St. Joseph Nursing Home, Inc., 459 N.W.2d 100, 103 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990), with
Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified Sch. Dist., 929 P.2d 582,591 (1997) and Cohen v. Wales, 133
A.D.2d 94 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997).
Moore, 459 N.W.2d at 102,103. The Michigan courts have refused to impose a legal duty
to disclose facts where the relationships were much closer than that between a former
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The Randi W. court rendered a different outcome than the Moore and
Cohen forums, because the Randi W. court simply dismissed these
persuasive authorities to conclude that the former employer made
favorable assertions and omissions about the employee, which
constituted a deceptive recommendation. 481
Under the theory of
negligent misrepresentation, the Randi W. court ruled the former
employer had a duty not to mislead a prospective employer.4 2
Therefore, the plaintiff in Randi W. was able to recover damage awards
simply because the court chose not to follow other state precedents and
decided to expand the tort duty owed to third parties. In short, although
the California forum in Randi W. and the federal court in Allstate pose
new liability on employers to disclose negative information when giving
a favorable reference and possibly a neutral reference, the New York and
Michigan legal systems are reluctant to expand the theory of negligence.
D.

The Future Effects of the Randi W., Allstate, and Gutzan Decisions

Some commentators predict that courts may go one step further
than the courts in Randi W., Allstate and Gutzan.483 When a former
employer gives a favorable reference, the Randi W. court held that the
former employer owes a duty of care to unknown third parties even
though no special relationship exists between the former employer and
the third party. 4 4 Further, the Allstate court attempted to expand that
duty one step further and explained that a former employer may be
liable when they provide a neutral reference to prospective employers
and the employee subsequently harms a third person.485 This expanded
tort liability demonstrates that courts are becoming less tolerant of
486
workplace violence and that they are holding employers responsible.
In the future, courts could further expand the duty of care owed to third
parties when the former employer decides not to comment at all when
asked to give a reference.48 7 In other words, employers should be aware
that in upcoming decisions, plaintiffs could argue that "no comment"
policies and neutral job references that omit information about a former
employee's violent nature lead to misrepresentation or negligence

employer and prospective employer, or third parties. Id. But see Randi W., 929 P.2d at 591

and Cohen, 133 A.D.2d at 95.
48

1Randi W., 929 P.2d at 592.

- Id.
4

m See infra note 484 and accompanying text.
4" Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified Sch. Dist., 929 P.2d 582,591 (1997).
See supranotes 409-22 and accompanying text.
u6 Friedman, supra note 318, at 3.
4v Reibstein, supra note 18, at B7.
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liability. 488 By this reasoning, former employers will want to avoid a
negligence action and abandon their "no comment" and neutral
reference policies. Employers may also be more encouraged to recognize
the protection against defamation liability under the qualified privilege
statutes, because they may be held to disclose negative information
under this expanded tort liability.
Conversely, the ultimate effect of the Randi W., Allstate and Gutzan
opinions may be that employers will keep their "no comment" and
neutral job reference practices and refrain from giving purely positive or
purely negative references. 4" The courts in Randi W. and Gutzan
determined that misrepresentation liability could ensue once the
employer chooses to speak favorably about an employee.490 The Allstate
court indicated that such liability could occur once the employer gives a
neutral reference. 491 These decisions reinforce the idea that these
restrictive policies will prevent not only defamation liability but also
negligent misrepresentation
and intentional misrepresentation
liability. 492 The bottom line is that under the current legal climate,
employers are safe if they just say nothing. 493
However, employment law experts say that information that could
prevent risking the safety of co-workers and the public-at-large should
be disclosed. 494 Similarly, this Note posits that these restrictive policies
present many problems because they deter the free flow of information

supra note 18, at B5 (asserting, "[e]mployers ...should bear in mind that future
plaintiffs may seek to expand the court's decision so as to cover "neutral" job references
and those that do not include an explicit recommendation to hire"); McMorris, supranote 8,
at B1 (referring to a Vice President's statement that his company verifies only dates of
employment, and is considering changing its policy because of the new California law
presented by Randi W. and the Allstate case).
4m Allan H. Weitzman and Kathleen M. McKenna, In Light of Several Decisions Holding
Employers Liablefor Their Employee References, Many Companies Choose Not to Give Any, NAT'L
L.J., May 19,1997, at B4; Jeff Richgels, Giving References Has Become a Sticky Widget, Wis. ST.
J., Feb. 12, 1997, at IC available in 1997 WL 7052124; Kenny, supra note 9, at 1; Saxton,
Employment References, supranote 307, at 262.
49 0
Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified Sch. Dist., 929 P.2d 582, 591 (1997); Gutzan v. Altair
Airlines, Inc., 766 F.2d 135, 141 (3d Cir. 1985); Saxton, Employment References, supra note 307,
at 265.
491See supra notes 409-22 and accompanying text.
492See supra notes 402,420 and accompanying text.
493
See supra notes 402, 420 and accompanying text. See also supranote 489.
494
McMorris, supra note 8, at B1; Shanoff, supra note 209, at 19 (reporting that although the
statutory qualified privilege laws do not force employers to disclose past violent behavior,
employment experts say employers should disclose such information).
4mReibstein,
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among employers. 495 Prospective employers cannot obtain complete and
accurate information about an applicant because former employers
refuse to discuss the applicant's performance in fear of defamation
liability and now, possible negligent misrepresentation liability.
Consequently, as illustrated in the opening paragraph, prospective
employers may hire a dangerous and violent individual, and
unknowingly place innocent third parties' or co-workers' safety at risk.
In turn, if the individual harms third parties, they are likely to file a
lawsuit against the new employer for negligently hiring a dangerous
employee. Former employers are also prospective employers, thus "no
comment" or neutral job reference policies expose all employers to
negligent hiring liability not just those employers hiring at that time. In
short, employers should be persuaded to discard their "no comment"
and neutral job reference policies, because there are serious negative
social and legal consequences if they do not. Furthermore, to encourage
employers to abandon their policies, this Note proposes that state
legislatures adopt "good faith" reference statutes that also place a
narrow duty to disclose information regarding a departing employee's
or former employee's violent or dangerous behavior.
V. A PROPOSED MODEL STATUTE TO ELIMINATE "NO COMMENT" AND
NEUTRAL JOB REFERENCE POLICIES

This Note proposes a model statute to be adopted by all states,
including those states that have already enacted "good faith" reference
laws.496 As already indicated, under the current qualified privilege
statutes, former employers may openly discuss negative information
about an employee as long as employers state the information in good
faith.497 However, the existing privilege statutes do not legally require
former employers to disclose this essential information. 498 Furthermore,
employers have no common law duty to speak about an employee or
former employee. 499 However, the proposed statute imposes a legal duty.
on former employers to freely discuss with prospective employers, an
employee's violent tendencies, dangerous propensities, or past sexual
misconduct. The proposed statute shields former employers from the
conflicting tort doctrines including defamation, negligence, and
negligent misrepresentation so long as former employers discuss an

495
See supra Part Il!, for a discussion on social and legal problems.
4 See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
497See supra notes 206-09 and accompanying text.
498 See supra notes 208-09 and accompanying text.
499
See supra notes 230-34,333 and accompanying text.
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employee's violent tendencies, dangerous propensities, and past sexual
misconduct. Former employers must also act in "good faith" and not
abuse the privilege or else the privilege will be lost.
In essence, this new statute promotes strong public policy of a
former employers' social and moral duty-50 to communicate information
to prospective employers and transforms this moral duty into a legal
obligation. Under the proposed law, employers will be forced to discard
their "no comment" polices or neutral job reference schemes and openly
discuss information without fear of litigation. Prospective employers
will be able to obtain the necessary information that they need from
former employers in order to hire qualified individuals. This statute is
intended to promote safer workplaces for employees and the public and
to protect prospective employers from potential negligent hiring liability.
Therefore, every state should ratify the following statutory provisions:
Sec. 1 Civil Immunity for Providing Employment References
(1) If an employer provides a reference upon the request of an
employee, former employee, or prospective employer, the
employer is presumed to be acting in goodfaith and is immune
from all civil liability that may result from providing that
reference as a matter of law, including but not limited to
defamation, negligent misrepresentation,and negligence.
Commentary
Section 1(1) sets forth the concept of civil immunity for employers
who provide references upon the request of an employee, former
employee, or prospective employer. Most of the current twenty-nine
states incorporated "upon the request" requirement in their immunity
statutes, thus the proposed statute will be consistent with these
incumbent statutes.53 Moreover, the statute's immunity applies only to
those employers who answer requests for referrals in order to protect the
former employee or departing employee from unnecessary defamatory
statements that could damage the employee's reputation.
§ 1(2) The presumption of good faith may be rebutted by showing
clear and convincing evidence that the employer made the
reference with actual malice. Actual malice means knowledge
Sw See, e.g., Moore v. St. Joseph Nursing Home, Inc., 459 N.W.2d 100, 103 (Mich. Ct. App.

1990); Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified Sch. Dist., 929 P.2d 582,591 (1997).
501See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
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that the information was false or a reckless disregard of
whether the information was false. The rebutted presumption
of good faith shall be judged as a matter of law.
Commentary
Section 1(2) of the statute establishes a presumption that the
employer acted within "good faith" and places the burden on the
complainant to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the
employer acted with malicious intent or knowingly gave false
information in the reference. Similar to the common law qualified
privilege502 and most qualified privilege statutes,50 3 under the proposed
statute, an employer will forfeit the privilege if it is abused.
Nevertheless, the presumption of "good faith" favors the employer. If
an employer is aware that the law places the burden of proof on the
employee to show that the employer did not act in good faith by a
showing of clear and convincing evidence, then the employer will be
more comfortable with providing both positive and negative information
about the employees. Hence, the employer will be encouraged to open
the channels of communication. Additionally, under Section 1(2), the
cases involving civil immunity for employers will be tried as a matter of
law. -Hence, the judge will decide whether the complainant provided
clear and convincing evidence that the employer did not act in good
faith. By having the case decided early in the litigation process
regarding the issue of whether the employer has acted in good faith, the
employer faces relatively low litigation expenses. The low cost of
defending a defamation claim provides an excellent incentive for
employers to discard their "no comment" policies and exchange them for
more open reference policies.504 In addition, this statute applies
compatible terms by incorporating the New York Times standard of
"actual malice" with the corresponding clear and convincing burden of
proof.505 By requiring the states to adopt a more rigorous "actual malice"
standard rather than the mere negligence standard, which is already
required for an employee's prima facie case for a defamation cause of

See supra notes
5w See supra notes
" See supra notes
f See supra notes
s

172-80 and accompanying
206-21 and accompanying
293-99 and accompanying
212-21 and accompanying
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action, the statute preserves the employer's qualified privilegeavoiding the "meaningless defense."5 °6
Sec. 2 An Employer's Statutory Duty to Disclose Information for
Employment References
(1) If a prospective employer requests a reference, and the
responding employer honestly believes that an employee or
former employee demonstrated violent tendencies, dangerous
propensities, or past sexual misconduct, the employer shall
disclose such information to a prospective employer, if
disclosing such information would prevent aforeseeable risk of
harm to others.507
Commentary
Section 2(1) supports the public policy argument that all employers
have a social and moral duty to offer information that could prevent
foreseeable physical safety risks to co-employees at the new employer's

N6 See supra notes 189-92 and accompanying text; see supra notes 217-21 and accompanying

text.
50 The "duty to disclose" requirement under Section 2(1) of the proposed statute may
present a constitutional issue regarding an employer's First Amendment "right not to
speak." Under a First Amendment analysis, there is a substantial dissimilarity between
this Note's proposed "duty to disclose" principle with a "duty to disclose" standard
presented in the case of InternationalDairy Foods Assoc. v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 1996).
In Amestoy, dairy manufacturers constitutionally challenged a Virginia statute that required
the manufactures to disclose information that revealed whether their milk product
contained milk from cows that had been treated with a growth hormone. Id. at 72, 74. The
manufacturers claimed that this infringed upon their First Amendment right not to speak.
Id. The Second Circuit Court agreed with the manufactures and held that the statute
infringed upon their right not to speak. Id. at 73. The Amestoy court reasoned that since
Vermont defended the statute's "duty to disclose" requirement on the basis of strong
consumer interests and the public's right to know, instead of health and safety concerns, it
did not provide a substantial state interest for the compelled disclosure. Id. Therefore, the
Court implied that a substantial state interest would consist of a showing of the public's
health and safety concerns and that the safety interest of the public would have passed
constitutional muster. Id. In comparing the Virginia statute in the Amestoy case to the
proposed statute, the legislative intent for proposing the Virginia statute was not based on
health and safety concerns, but mere consumer interests in the purchase of milk products.
Whereas the primary purpose of this Note's proposed law is the health and safety of
employees and the public-at-large. Unlike the Court in Amestoy, other courts shall find that
the proposed statute containing a "duty to disclose" limited information about a departing
employee or former employee, has a substantial interest in preventing harm to the public.
Therefore, the proposed statute should pass First Amendment scrutiny.
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workplace and to the public-at-large. 5°8 The legislative intent is to create
a statutory duty for employers to disclose information concerning a
former employee's dangerous propensities, violent behavior, or past
sexual misconduct. The disclosure of these critical facts will help
prospective employers gather essential information about a job applicant
and make well-informed hiring decisions. Moreover, this statutory duty
imposed on employers ensures that third parties harmed by the omission
of such essential information will not be barred from bringing negligence
claim or negligent misrepresentation claim against the former employer.
The proposed statute prevents the harsh outcome in Moore v. St. Joseph
Nursing Home, Inc.s° 9 The Moore Court held that the Michigan statute's
conditional privilege merely permitted employers to reveal information
concerning a former employee to a prospective employer, but employers
were not legally obligated to do so.510 Therefore, the plaintiffs in Moore
had no legal cause of action against the former employer, because the
employer had no statutory or common law duty to disclose such
information regarding a former employee's violent behavior on the
job.511 This section prevents the unjust outcome found in the Moore case
by ensuring that injured third parties have an opportunity to bring legal
action against former employers who refused to disclose information
that could have prevented harm to them. In such a situation, employers
will be in a position to supply the essential employment information
because the qualified privilege statute provides civil immunity from
defamation liability.
§ 2(2) If the employer fails to comply with the statutory duty to
disclose an employee's or a former employee's violent
tendencies, dangerous propensities, past sexual misconduct
under § 2(1) of this statute, then civil immunity shall not
protect the employer under this statute.
Commentary
Section 2(2) expands the ruling in Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified
5 12
School District
and exposes employers to defamation, negligence, and

s" See, e.g., Moore v. St. Joseph Nursing Home, Inc., 459 N.W.2d 100, 103 (Mich. Ct. App.

1990); Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified Sch. Dist., 929 P.2d 582,591 (1997).
w9 459 N.W.2d 100 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990).
510Id. 102,103.
511Id. at 103. Note that in all of the twenty-nine "good faith" reference laws, there is no

duty to disclose information about an employee even if such information would prevent
foreseeable risk of harm to third parties. See supra notes 206-09 and accompanying text
512
See discussion supra Part U.C.1.
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negligent misrepresentation liability when they fail to disclose to
prospective employers information about an employee's or former
employee's dangerous propensities, violent tendencies, or past sexual
misconduct.
In other words, if employers say nothing about an
employee's or former employee's violent behavior, and give just a
favorable reference, a neutral reference, or no reference, the employer
forfeits the civil immunity provided for in section 1(1). Moreover,
omitting this essential information will subject employers to liability
regardless of whether the employer provided a favorable reference only,
a neutral reference, or no information under a "no comment" policy.
When disclosing this limited information, employers should not fear that
courts will hold them liable for defamation since employers will be
protected against such claims under section 1(1) provided that
employers do not abuse the privilege. As indicated, section 1(1)
encourages employers to discard neutral references and "no comment"
policies by granting them civil immunity for not only defamation
charges brought by former employees but also negligent
misrepresentation and negligent claims brought by unknown third
parties such as the plaintiffs in Randi W., Gutzan, and Allstate. 13 Under
the current law, courts have refused to impose a blanket duty on the part
of former employers to disclose negative information about a former
employee to prospective employers.5 14 Furthermore, under statutory
qualified privilege law, legislatures have not approved a statutory duty
to disclose information about a departing employee's or former
employee's violent tendencies.5 15 However, the proposed statute works
to prevent hideous and violent crimes described in the cases of Garcia,
Randi W., Gutzan, Allstate, Cohen, and Moore because under the new
statute, former employers will have a legal duty to disclose information
regarding a former employee's propensity for violence, criminal
behavior, or past sexual misconduct. Former employers will alert
prospective employers to a potentially dangerous applicant or employee.
From this essential information, prospective employers will be able to
make more well informed hiring decisions and prevent harm to
employees and the public.

supra notes 358-441 and accompanying text.
supra notes 230-34, 334 and accompanying text.
515See supra notes 208-09 and accompanying text.
523See
514See
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VI. CONCLUSION
This Note asserts that by trading in their "no comment" and neutral
job reference policies in exchange for more open policies, former
employers will avoid potential tort claims such as defamation and
negligent misrepresentation, and prospective employers will have the
essential information to make sound hiring decisions.
Currently,
prospective employers are unable to obtain complete references, and as a
result, they may hire an individual without knowing whether that
individual engaged in violent or criminal behavior, or is simply
incompetent. This lack of knowledge regarding a new employee's
violent behavior may place the safety of co-employees as well as other
third parties at risk. "No comment" and neutral job reference policies
seemed to be an excellent solution to potential defamation litigation, but
these practices created further problems for prospective employers
seeking to obtain full and truthful references, such as negligent hiring
liability. This Note asserts that if former employers embrace the
defamation defenses such as the truth or the qualified privilege defense,
then employers will be able to freely communicate among themselves
and liberally discuss information on former employees without fearing
potential defamation liability. Furthermore, the model statute provides
an incentive for employers to implement more open communication
practices regarding references while simultaneously imposing a legal
duty to disclose only limited information regarding departing employees
or former employees, such as their violent tendencies, dangerous
propensities, and past sexual misconduct. By imposing a "duty to
disclose" in special circumstances, prospective employers will have an
opportunity to learn about a potentially dangerous applicant. As a
result, employers can make proper hiring decisions and provide a safer
workplace.
Susan Oliver
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